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5 
Issues and Recommendations 
Non-Proliferation in Areas of Limited Statehood: 
The Contribution of International Regimes to 
Controlling Mass Destruction Capacities in War 
and Crisis Zones 
Non-proliferation regimes for nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons face many challenges. Treaty 
violations by governments that aim to develop WMD 
are the most serious problem. International law pro-
vides procedures for dealing with such breaches of 
a treaty. Such noncompliance procedures have for 
example already been used against North Korea and 
Iran. Increasingly, however, the implementation of 
rules to control WMD in areas of limited statehood has 
demonstrated their shortcomings. Striking examples 
are Syria and Iraq, where chemical weapons have been 
used very recently. Existing rules and procedures are 
insufficient to tackle the challenges of controlling 
capacities to produce or use nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons in areas of limited statehood, even 
though this is a particularly urgent task. 
In areas of limited statehood, WMD control – mean-
ing all the measures aimed at WMD disarmament and 
non-proliferation – will remain a challenge. The world-
wide trend towards the disintegration of states or loss 
of statehood, the increase of non-international armed 
conflicts, the emergence of transnational terrorist 
groups and the proliferation of sensitive technologies 
are formidable challenges for the international com-
munity. These problems are accumulating in the 
Middle East and South and East Asia, in particular. 
Controlling WMD in areas of crisis and war is a key 
challenge for Germany’s foreign and security policy. 
If such weapons get into the hands of terrorist groups, 
there is a risk of WMD attacks in Europe. Biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons also pose a threat to 
people living in war and crisis regions. The existence 
of such potentials complicates political solutions for 
regional conflicts. Finally, from a European perspec-
tive it is also urgent to strengthen the international 
order by adjusting multilateral non-proliferation 
regimes to crisis developments. 
The experiences since 2003 of controlling WMD 
in Iraq, Libya and Syria have been mixed. In Iraq and 
Libya, remaining chemical weapons and precursors 
became a proliferation risk because the international 
community acted too slowly. The process of eliminat-
ing Syria’s chemical weapons, begun in 2013, was 
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6 
swift but remains incomplete. The danger of these 
weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups 
is far from over. Government forces and the terror-
ist militia “Islamic State” continue to use chemical 
weapons and threaten populations. Criminal pros-
ecution of these war crimes remains out of sight. 
However, at least Syria’s most dangerous chemical 
weapons have been removed from Syria and eliminated 
in a concerted multilateral operation. The international 
community is investigating the continued chemical 
attacks in Syria and has – for the first time ever – in a 
few cases identified those responsible for such atrocities. 
These encouraging results were possible because 
the Syrian government under threat of military inter-
vention acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and cooperated with international organisations. 
Moreover, relevant great powers – especially Russia 
and the United States – as well as several international 
organisations collaborated on inspecting, securing, 
transporting and destroying Syria’s declared chemical 
weapons. 
If those successes are to be repeated, some of the 
rules and procedures of non-proliferation regimes 
should be adapted to the particular conditions typical 
of areas of limited statehood. In fragile or collapsing 
states, central governments – which as signatories to 
a treaty are responsible for its implementation – have 
no (or at best limited) control over their own territory. 
The state’s leaders may be unwilling and/or unable 
to comply with the treaty. Acting in crisis areas also 
requires special security and logistical measures. New 
procedures for acquiring relevant information will 
also have to be found. Communicating and cooper-
ating with non-state actors on the ground often poses 
an additional political hurdle. Finally, existing rules 
for eliminating weapon potentials or investigating 
the alleged use of WMD need to be adapted, or new 
procedures need to be created. 
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) has played a pivotal role in elimi-
nating Syrian chemical warfare agents outside the 
country, despite the unfavourable conditions of civil 
war. Multilateral treaties – such as the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiat-
ing, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, the 1972 Biological Weapons Con-
vention (BWC), the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (CWC) – are fundamental normative, political 
and practical reference points for controlling WMD, 
even and especially in areas of limited statehood. 
A reform of inter-state regimes should follow the 
motto “As few rules as necessary, as much preparation 
as possible”. Four issues are essential. First, prevention 
must be improved by securing as early as possible 
weapons or sensitive technologies. Second, planning 
should be adapted to crisis scenarios. Third, member 
states of international organisations dealing with 
WMD non-proliferation issues should create the con-
ditions for interacting with relevant non-state actors 
in war and crisis zones. Fourth, the central role of the 
United Nations Security Council in controlling WMD 
should be strengthened and the Council should also 
be tied more closely to multilateral non-proliferation 
regimes. 
These measures could help to better prepare the 
international community for future challenges in con-
trolling WMD. They would also increase the effective-
ness of international regulatory institutions. They 
would thus dovetail with Germany’s foreign policy 
agenda, which focuses on strong and resilient inter-
national organisations, especially under conditions of 
permanent crisis. Over the past few years, the German 
federal government has already provided much and 
varied support for disarmament operations. In the fu-
ture, it will also be vital that Berlin more forcefully 
takes the political initiative to implement some of the 
previously mentioned reforms. To this end, Germany 
will need to be more actively seeking like-minded part-
ners in the EU and G20. 
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7 
Controlling WMD in Areas of Limited Statehood 
 
Implementing regimes for controlling nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons is frequently particularly 
difficult in places where proliferation risks are high. 
Under conditions of international disorder, WMD or 
the capacities for their production are increasingly 
found in areas of limited statehood. 
In such areas of limited statehood, the central gov-
ernment may have the authority to govern – but in 
reality it exerts little or no control. Outside the OECD, 
only few states fulfil the (Western) ideal of the con-
solidated nation-state, which has full control over 
its territory as well as the means to comprehensively 
implement international rules.1 And there is a con-
tinuing trend towards weakened or failed states. In 
2015, the OECD classified about 50 states as fragile. 
Around 20 percent of the world’s population live in 
such countries.2 
This is a problematic development for effective 
worldwide WMD control because multilateral treaties 
are designed so that the central governments of states 
parties translate the prohibitions and obligations con-
tained in such treaties into national law. Governments 
are also obliged to enable administration, police and 
judiciary to apply and monitor implementation of 
national implementing legislation, so that violations 
can – to the degree possible – be detected, pursued 
and penalised. 
In areas of limited statehood, this model for im-
plementing international agreements at the national 
level does not work. Some forms of “governance” prac-
tised there can fulfil a number of political functions.3 
But these functions cannot include control over WMD 
 
1 Cf. Stephen D. Krasner and Thomas Risse, “External Actors, 
State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited 
Statehood: Introduction”, Governance 27, no. 4 (2014): 545–67; 
Thomas Risse, “Governance under Limited Sovereignty”, in Back to 
Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World, ed. Martha Finnemore 
and Judith Goldstein (New York, 2013), 78–104. 
2 Figures taken from OECD, States of Fragility 2015. Meeting Post-
2015 Ambitions (Paris, 2015), 31. 
3 Cf. Tobias Debiel, Stephan Klingebiel, Andreas Mehler et 
al., Zwischen Ignorieren und Intervenieren. Strategien und Dilemmata 
externer Akteure in fragilen Staaten, Policy Paper no. 25 (Bonn: 
Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, January 2005), http:// 
inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/pp_23_de.pdf (accessed 
2 March 2017). 
because the groups acting in such territories do not 
possess the legal or political legitimacy to own or 
operate such capacities. 
As long as areas of limited statehood do not pose a 
proliferation risk, governments or institutions dealing 
with non-proliferation have ignored or tolerated the 
ambivalent status of such regions. At times, they have 
resorted to pragmatic solutions to establish a certain 
degree of control in such regions, even if their legal 
status remained disputed. 
Two trends, however, have moved the issue of WMD 
in areas of limited statehood further towards the top 
of the political agenda. First, as a result of globalisa-
tion, more and more actors in more and more coun-
tries have access to relevant dual-use technologies.4 
Second, the number of armed conflicts is rising. Whilst 
in 2010 there had been 80 such conflicts globally, in 
2015 that number rose to 147. Most worrying (given 
the implications of a loss of state control) is the par-
ticularly sharp increase in non-state actors partici-
pating in armed conflicts.5 Many of these armed con-
flicts occur in regions where WMD or WMD capacities 
are present. Transnational terrorist groups with a 
declared interest in possessing WMD aggravate the 
problem. 
It is therefore no coincidence that efforts to elimi-
nate WMD and investigate alleged uses increasingly 
target nations which are in a state of civil war or other 
armed conflict, including recently Iraq, Libya and Syria. 
In the context of this report, problems of control-
ling WMD capacities in areas of limited statehood are 
discussed when they arise under conditions of war or 
crisis. It is beyond the scope of this study to compre-
hensively examine the implementation of international 
regimes in all areas not fully under state control, in-
 
4 Cf. Oliver Meier, “Dual-use Technology Transfers and the 
Legitimacy of Non-proliferation Regimes”, in Technology Trans-
fers and Non-Proliferation. Between Control and Cooperation, ed. 
Oliver Meier (New York et al., 2014), 3–21. 
5 In 2010 the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded 
28 non-state armed conflicts; in 2015 there were 71. Casualty 
figures of armed conflicts have almost quadrupled between 
2010 (30,700) and 2015 (118,400): see UCDP, Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program, Uppsala, http://ucdp.uu.se/#/exploratory 
(accessed 25 November 2016). 
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8 
cluding in those regions where no violent conflicts or 
risks of such conflicts exist. 
Controlling WMD in crisis and war environments is 
important for several reasons. First and foremost, the 
growing risk of WMD use must be reduced in order 
to protect local populations. Second, terrorist organi-
sations must be prevented from obtaining such weap-
ons. Internationally active groups could use such 
weapons for attacks also in Europe.6 Third, such con-
trol efforts can help to strengthen international order 
by further developing multilateral disarmament 
regimes. To uphold international norms against WMD, 
violations must have consequences, no matter where 
they occur. The organisations in charge of implement-
ing these rules – especially the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), but also the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council – will have to 
live up to the challenges that arise in a world increas-
ingly in disarray. If they are unable to tackle these 
challenges, the regimes (as well as the norms em-
bedded in them) run the long-term risk of losing 
political support and thus their relevance. 
As a middle power, Germany is committed to the 
search for peaceful solutions to regional conflicts. 
Berlin sees multilateral treaties and mechanisms for 
disarmament and arms control as “an indispensable 
contribution to maintaining peace and security”7 as 
well as the international order. These premises make 
problems with controlling WMD in areas of limited 
statehood directly relevant for Germany’s foreign 
policy. To sum up: if “crisis is becoming a permanent 
condition”,8 the question arises how the established 
and proven arms control structures can be adapted to 
meet the new challenges of decreasing statehood and 
increasing conflicts. 
The central question of this study is therefore: 
How can the ability of international regimes to con-
trol nuclear, biological and chemical mass destruction 
capacities in areas of limited statehood be improved? 
 
6 Moreover, such attacks can be carried out using simple 
chemicals that do not issue from state programmes: see Wil-
liam M. Alley and Jessica L. Jones, “An Analysis of the Threat 
of Malicious Chemical Use by Nonstate Actors: Questioning 
the State-based Approach to Chemical Nonproliferation”, 
The Nonproliferation Review 22, no. 3–4 (2015): 301–19. 
7 German Federal Foreign Office, Review 2014 – A Fresh Look at 
Foreign Policy (Berlin, 2015), 45, <https://www.yumpu.com/en/ 
document/download/37355057/41950-2259c-f1521-4fb59-
25a9d-9b0ea-eafd8-214c9> (accessed 13 July 2017). 
8 Ibid., 8. 
Analysing the Risk 
In an acute crisis, there are two crucial tasks from the 
perspective of non-proliferation policy. The immediate 
risks of use or proliferation of nuclear, biological, 
chemical or radiological weapons must be minimised 
by securing, removing and destroying them.9 Second, 
if applicable, any allegations of WMD use must be 
resolved. Routine tasks, such as the verification of non-
production of prohibited items, can normally only be 
carried out after the crisis has ended and the govern-
ment’s capacity to exert control over its territory has 
been restored. 
The greatest challenges in this regard can currently 
be found in the Middle East. In Asia, too, a trend to-
wards the loss of control over mass destruction tech-
nologies is observable. 
This study is chiefly concerned with issues of chemi-
cal weapons disarmament, since these are currently 
the focus of non-proliferation efforts. In Iraq, Libya and 
Syria, efforts are being made or have been made to 
control chemical weapons programmes. However, 
many of the challenges described below also apply 
mutatis mutandis to nuclear and biological weapons 
as well as relevant sensitive technologies. It has to be 
taken into account that WMD control regimes differ 
with regard to their scope and institutional arrange-
ments. This study does not examine problems of con-
trolling conventional weapons. Conventional weapons 
have a lesser potential for destruction than WMD and 
there is a lack of norms, rules, procedures and institu-
tions that could form the basis of control efforts for 
them. 
In areas of limited statehood, two factors compli-
cate the implementation of rules and procedures for 
WMD control. First, the political conditions for taking 
action in such areas must be in place. As a rule, the 
central government must at the very least tolerate dis-
armament operations or investigations of alleged use. 
Relevant great powers and international organisations 
 
9 A research project funded by the US Department of Defense 
has identified three future challenges in eliminating WMD: 
1. the danger emanating from states with active WMD pro-
grammes (especially North Korea); 2. the difficulty of control-
ling non-state actors “that are likely to be active within failed 
or fragile states or ungoverned territories”; 3. the problem of 
incomplete disarmament of known WMD programmes – see 
Philipp C. Bleek, Chen Kane and Joshua H. Pollack, “Elimina-
tion of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from the Last 
Quarter-century”, The Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 1–2 (2016): 
15–23, 16. 
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9 
have to be willing to cooperate. Second, existing rules 
and procedure for verifying and implementing dis-
armament and non-proliferation obligations must be 
adapted to the specific conditions that apply in crisis 
areas. Logistical and security challenges, procedures 
for information gathering, and funding requirements 
can differ in the context of fragile states. Additionally, 
it may be necessary to deal with non-state actors. There 
may be a variety of such actors, ranging from oppo-
sition groups to armed militias and warlords, which 
may either control a territory over an extended period 
or use an area of limited statehood as a temporary 
refuge. 
This study, which is primarily based on analysing 
the relevant secondary literature and primary sources,10 
focuses on the practical problems of implementing 
WMD disarmament and non-proliferation obligations 
in crisis areas. The political context within which dis-
armament operations take place is taken into consid-
eration. However, any wider discussion of the politics 
involved, such as an analysis of the great powers’ inter-
ests in relevant areas, is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
 
 
10 From 2015 to early 2017 interviews on background were 
conducted with decision-makers in Berlin and The Hague. I 
wish to thank several colleagues for providing comments on 
the design of this study and specific chapters. Many thanks 
go to Jonathan Trautmann and Sira Cordes for help with re-
search. Any remaining errors are my responsibility alone. 
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Political Support and Cooperation 
 
With few exceptions,11 arms control is based on the 
traditional intergovernmental model underpinning 
the international order. This stipulates that states 
parties to multilateral agreements must implement 
treaty provisions in their entire territory. For inter-
national organisations, central governments are the 
competent and only legitimate partners in imple-
menting these agreements under international law. 
Routine measures to verify member states’ treaty 
compliance rarely make the headlines. Since the entry 
into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
in 1997, the OPCW has carried out over 6,000 routine 
inspections.12 In 2015 alone, the IAEA carried out about 
2,000 routine safeguards inspections. But these activ-
ities did not attract significant political attention.13 
By contrast, efforts to control WMD in areas of limited 
statehood often take place in geopolitical hotspots and 
thus under close public and media scrutiny. Three 
questions must be answered before control measures 
can be carried out in such a highly politicised context. 
Does the central government back the mission? Do 
relevant great powers support the mission? How good 
is the cooperation between international organisa-
tions? 
 
11 Geneva Call, an NGO based in Switzerland, works to per-
suade armed non-state actors (ANSAs) to respect agreements 
banning the use of anti-personnel mines, protecting children 
from the consequences of armed conflicts, and prohibiting 
sexual violence in armed conflicts. To date (July 2017), 59 
ANSAs have signed deeds of commitment: see Geneva Call, 
“Armed Non-State Actors”, genevacall.org (online), https:// 
genevacall.org/how-we-work/armed-non-state-actors/ (accessed 
11 July 2017). 
12 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW), Three Types of Inspections, Fact Sheet 5 (The Hague, 
March 2016), http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Fact_ 
Sheets/English/Fact_Sheet_5_-_Inspections.pdf (accessed 
31 March 2017). 
13 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Safeguards 
in Practice”, iaea.org (online), http://www.iaea.org/topics/ 
safeguards-in-practice (accessed 10 November 2016). 
The Role of Central Government 
As a rule, international non-proliferation regimes can 
only be implemented where a state party holds the 
monopoly on power and is willing to open up relevant 
territory to international verification measures. This 
restriction is unproblematic insofar as “almost all 
nations observe almost all principles of international 
law and almost all of their obligations almost all of 
the time”.14 Arms control against a state’s will has so 
far only occurred where that state had lost a war.15 
The central government’s official or at least tacit 
approval of on-site activities has up to now been a 
precondition for operations by international organisa-
tions in areas of limited statehood. However, it is a 
characteristic of such areas that the state party/parties 
lack the will and/or the ability to comply with their 
international obligations to control WMD. In such 
cases, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts can 
take place in grey areas of control. 
Three main scenarios are possible. First, a govern-
ment may lose control over parts of its territory through 
disintegration of the state or as part of a military con-
frontation. This development leaves it too weak to 
establish the conditions for verification of the relevant 
area or facility. For instance, after 2011 the recently-
formed Libyan national government was unable to 
provide international inspectors safe access to the re-
maining chemical weapons in the country.16 
In the second scenario, the central government may 
(nominally) exert control and declare its readiness to 
cooperate but its actual willingness to support inter-
national control efforts is limited. For example, a gov-
 
14 Louis Henkin quoted in Abram Chayes and Antonia 
Handler Chayes, “On Compliance”, International Organization 
47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 175–205 (177). 
15 For example, the arms limitations imposed on Germany 
in the Treaty of Versailles or the disarmament of Iraq’s WMD 
by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) after 
Iraq had lost the 1991 Gulf War: see Jean P. Zanders, “Hybrid 
Disarmament Framework and Slowdowns”, The Trench (on-
line), 8 February 2014, http://www.the-trench.org/hybrid-
disarmament-framework/ (accessed 10 November 2016). 
16 Cf. Patrick Terrell, Katharine Hagen and Ted A. Ryba Jr., 
“Eliminating Libya’s WMD Programs: Creating a Cooperative 
Situation”, The Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 1–2 (2016): 185–96. 
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ernment may cite security concerns in order to sus-
pend or terminate cooperation with a disarmament 
agency. For external actors it is then often difficult 
to gauge whether such concerns are real or simply a 
pretext.17 This is compounded by the fact that external 
actors tend to believe a cooperative (or apparently co-
operative) partner when they need their cooperation.18 
The situation becomes even more complicated when 
the possessor state leverages the need to approve a 
WMD control mission as a means to achieve secondary 
objectives.19 
Third, grey areas can develop if several governments 
lay claim to the same territory. For example, after Rus-
sia’s annexation of the Crimea in spring 2014, Ukraine 
asked the IAEA to protect a research reactor in Sevasto-
pol from being seized by Russia.20 Kiev also demanded 
that the IAEA continue to inspect the reactor accord-
ing to the safeguards procedures established for 
Ukraine, whilst Moscow offered to carry out nuclear 
safeguards under the rules valid for Russia.21 As a con-
sequence, the IAEA has not inspected the facility since 
the Russian occupation. In the case of Taiwan, it was 
possible to bypass such status issues and thus assure 
the inspection of nuclear facilities through a pragmatic 
approach.22 
 
17 An example is the removal of Syrian chemical weapons 
from a storage facility in the port of Latakia, which was de-
layed for months. There was great uncertainty over whether 
or not Damascus was using security concerns as a pretext to 
retain control over these weapons: see Louis Charbonneau, 
“Syria Chemical Arms Destruction Deadline Won’t Be Met – 
U.N.”, Reuters, 29 May 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/05/29/uk-syria-crisis-chemicalweapons-idUKKBN0E82F 
320140529 (accessed 30 May 2014). 
18 After 2003, there was a widespread belief that Gaddafi 
was prepared to comprehensively eliminate Libya’s chemical 
weapons. This assumption turned out to be wrong: see Nathan 
E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat, “Disarming Libya? A Reassess-
ment after the Arab Spring”, in: International Affairs 89, no. 2 
(2013): 451–75. 
19 On this point, see The Editors, “Diplomatic Strategies 
for Eliminating WMD”, The Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 1–2 
(2016): 49–59 (54–57). 
20 Michael Mariotte, “Russia Seizes Ukrainian Nuclear University/ 
Research Reactor in Crimea”, GreenWorld (online), 8 April 2014, 
http://safeenergy.org/2014/04/08/russia-seizes-ukrainian-
reactor (accessed 19 May 2014). 
21 Nuclear weapon states are subject to less stringent veri-
fication obligations than non-nuclear weapon states. 
22 In 1971, Beijing assumed sole representation of China 
(including Taiwan) at the United Nations. After the People’s 
Republic of China joined the IAEA in 1983, it became the 
organisation’s sole point of contact, including for carrying 
out safeguards in Taiwan. However, since 1972 IAEA safe-
Hybrid scenarios which contain elements of several 
of these scenarios would be even more complicated. 
The Support of the Great Powers 
Over the past two decades, the international commu-
nity has used three strategies to motivate uncoopera-
tive states to collaborate with efforts of WMD control. 
It has appealed to the self-interest of the states in ques-
tion, created incentives, and threatened to impose 
(and actually imposed) sanctions.23 
With the latter two strategies, it is especially cru-
cial that politically, militarily and financially power-
ful nations support disarmament missions. Such coun-
tries can provide incentives and disincentives to in-
duce sceptical or reluctant actors to cooperate. Thus, 
the United States’ threat of military strikes against 
Syria in 2013 presumably helped to encourage Damas-
cus to accede to the CWC and agree to disclose and 
eliminate chemical weapons stockpiles. Ten years ear-
lier, in 2003, the United Kingdom and United States 
had held out to Muhammad Gaddafi the prospect of 
relaxing Libya’s international isolation if he agreed to 
disclose Libya’s programmes for producing WMD and 
to eliminate these weapons. After the invasion of Iraq, 
the threat of US military action against Libya was pal-
pable.24 As a result, Gaddafi disclosed his chemical and 
nuclear weapons programmes. 
Since the five permanent Security Council members 
are (or were) WMD possessor states, they often possess 
the necessary experience and knowledge to deal with 
such capabilities. Their consent is also a prerequisite for 
any Security Council mandate authorising a disarma-
ment mission. 
Russian and US cooperation in the elimination of 
Syrian chemical weapons is a good example of the 
positive role great powers can play. Experts from both 
countries had begun discussions on the disclosure and 
destruction of Syrian chemical weapons about a year 
before the 14 September 2013 Russian-US framework 
 
guards of all relevant nuclear installations in Taiwan had 
already been carried out informally on the basis of a trilateral 
agreement between the IAEA, Taiwan and the United States: 
see David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
The First Forty Years (Vienna, 1997), 93, 111, 133. 
23 On this point, see The Editors, “Diplomatic Strategies” 
(see note 19), 49–59. 
24 Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Rollback of Libya’s Chemical 
Weapons Program”, The Nonproliferation Review 16, no. 3 (2009): 
363–84. 
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was agreed.25 This bilateral agreement, concluded in 
Geneva, anticipated many of the practical problems 
that would arise during the process of verifying, 
securing and destroying the weapons stockpile. The 
framework proposed solutions and prepared decisions 
to be taken by international organisations. 
Great power cooperation improves the political con-
ditions for the inclusion of third states. The latter’s par-
ticipation is important because they can bring further 
capacities for WMD control and elimination to the 
table. Third states can also increase the political legiti-
macy of such operations by countering the impression 
that disarmament is a great power diktat. In the case 
of Syria, five other nations contributed naval assets to 
support chemical weapons elimination by the United 
States and Russia.26 
The United States as a global power has significant 
political influence and commands unique military 
and technical capabilities. Washington’s political and 
practical involvement is therefore a necessary (albeit 
not always sufficient) condition for the success of 
international efforts to control WMD in crisis zones.27 
Cooperation between 
International Organisations 
For endeavours to control WMD in areas of limited 
statehood to be successful, it is necessary that inter-
national organisations work very closely together and 
combine their complementary abilities and exper-
tise.28 Such cooperation can be based on existing frame-
work agreements or it can be organised in an ad hoc 
manner, in the context of case-specific cooperation 
 
25 OPCW, Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons. 
Joint Paper by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, 
EC-M-33/NAT.1 (The Hague, 17 September 2013), http://www. 
opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33nat01_e_.pdf (ac-
cessed 31 March 2017). 
26 China, Denmark, Finland, the UK and Norway: see OPCW-
UN Joint Mission in Syria, Status of Contributions to the OPCW-
UN Joint Mission in Syria, 17 February 2014, http://opcw. 
unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Yw0vVMzJwvw= 
&tabid=205 (accessed 2 March 2017). 
27 On the capacity of the US security agencies to innovate 
in response to proliferation crises, see e.g. Andy Weber and 
Christine L. Parthemore, “Innovation in Countering Weapons 
of Mass Destruction”, in: Arms Control Today 46, no. 6 (July/ 
August 2015): 23–26; see also Rebecca Hersman, “Strategic 
Challenges to WMD Elimination”, in: The Nonproliferation 
Review 23, no. 1–2 (2016): 31–47 (44–46). 
28 See Bleek et al., “Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion” (see note 9), 19. 
arrangements. The IAEA and OPCW are so-called UN 
“related organisations” but they can directly interact 
with the Security Council and General Assembly.29 
Their relationships with the UN are set out in separate 
agreements, which are, for example, intended to guar-
antee their staff the safe conduct to an inspected state 
party (through a UN laissez-passer).30 
From October 2013 to September 2014, the UN and 
OPCW worked together as equal partners in the Joint 
Mission on the elimination of chemical weapons in 
Syria.31 Since August 2015, they have likewise been on 
an equal footing within the Joint Investigative Mecha-
nism (JIM), which tries to identify those responsible 
for using chemical weapons. During the mission to 
eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons, the OPCW’s col-
laboration with a number of other international orga-
nisations went far beyond routine operations and was 
arranged on the basis of a network of agreements and 
memoranda of understanding.32 
International organisations compete for resources, 
tasks and attention. This can cause friction, as it occa-
sionally did during the joint action to control WMD,33 
 
29 Both organisations can thus refer serious violations of 
IAEA or CWC provisions directly to the Security Council: see 
Dirk Schriefer, “Die IAEA im System der Vereinten Nationen”, 
in 50 Jahre Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation IAEA. Ein Wir-
ken für Frieden und Sicherheit im nuklearen Zeitalter, ed. Dirk 
Schriefer, Walter Sandtner and Wolfgang Rudischhauser, 
1st ed. (Baden-Baden, 2007), 149–53 (151). 
30 See e.g. Sheel K. Sharma, “The IAEA and the UN Family: 
Networks of Nuclear Co-operation”, in: IAEA Bulletin, no. 3 
(1995): 10–15, http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/magazines/bulletin/bull37-3/37305381015.pdf 
(accessed 2 March 2017); Walter Krutzsch and Treasa Dun-
worth, “Article VIII: The Organization”, in The Chemical Weap-
ons Convention. A Commentary, ed. Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer 
and Ralf Trapp, Oxford Commentaries on International Law, 
1st ed. (Oxford, 2014), 235–96 (279). 
31 Information and background can be found at http://opcw. 
unmissions.org. 
32 The OPCW cooperated with the UN Office for Disarma-
ment Affairs (UNODA), UN Office of Legal Affairs, UN Depart-
ment of Safety and Security (UNDSS), UN Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS) and the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
among others: see Ralf Trapp, Lessons Learned from the OPCW 
Mission in Syria. Report Submitted to the Director-General of the Tech-
nical Secretariat of the OPCW, (Chessenaz, France, 16 December 
2015), 2, http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/PDF/Lessons_ 
learned_from_the_OPCW_Mission_in_Syria.pdf (accessed 
2 March 2017). 
33 For instance, there were differences of opinion between 
the leader of the UN-OPCW Joint Mission and the OPCW’s 
Director-General regarding control over the mission: see Jean 
P. Zanders, “Üzümcü: ‘After Syria I Do Not See Any Country 
Able to Use Chemical Weapons Anymore’”, The Trench (online), 
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in particular when several organisations handled the 
same problem simultaneously. For example, at certain 
times after 2012, several organisations were engaged 
in independent but parallel investigations into alle-
gations of chemical weapons use in Syria. Different 
mandates and investigative methods, and a lack of 
coordination over publishing enquiry results, resulted 
in diverging statements on the extent of chemical 
weapons use and the identity of its perpetrators. Such 
contradictory reports can undermine the legitimacy 
of international investigations. 
For instance, on 4 June 2013 the Human Rights 
Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria published 
a report claiming that in at least four cases limited 
amounts of toxic chemicals in Syria had been re-
leased.34 At this point, Syria was still refusing UN and 
OPCW inspectors access to the country. As a conse-
quence, Åke Sellstrom, head of the team appointed 
under the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism for in-
vestigating alleged chemical weapon attacks, distanced 
himself from the Human Rights Council report. 
Investigations of chemical weapons use by individ-
ual nations (or their surrogates) can complicate inter-
national efforts to resolve allegations, too. Such uni-
lateral investigations do not usually meet the high 
standards of international inspections in terms of 
methodology, transparency and verifiability. Govern-
ments may carry them out deliberately to exert or 
deflect political pressure or to sow doubts about the 
results of international investigations. Russia, for 
example, has conducted several such investigations.35 
 
17 November 2014, http://www.the-trench.org/uzumcu-
interview/ (accessed 2 March 2017). 
34 It was particularly problematic that the chair of the 
Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria, 
Carla del Ponte, made a statement to this effect before the 
investigation report of her institution had even been pub-
lished: see Louis Charbonneau, “Syria Chemical Weapons: 
U.N. Warns of ‘Mounting Reports’”, HuffPost (online), 22 May 
2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/22/syria-
chemical-weapons-un_n_3320198.html; S. Johnson, “UN’s 
Carla Del Ponte Massively Undermines Investigation with ‘Syrian 
Rebels Used Sarin’ Claim”, CBRNe World News (online), 6 May 
2013, http://www.cbrneworld.com/news/uns_carla_del_ 
ponte_massively_undermines_investigation_with_syrian_ 
rebels_u#ixzz4FVMBn7WL (accessed 2 March 2017). 
35 For instance, Moscow independently investigated the 
alleged chemical weapon attacks on Khan al-Assal in March 
2013, and then made its report partially available to UN 
Security Council members in July 2013: AFP, “UN Chemical 
Inquiry Hopes Hit by Fall of Syrian Town”, Hurriyet Daily News 
(online), 24 July 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ 
un-chemical-inquiry-hopes-hit-by-fall-of-syrian-town.aspx? 
However, the United States and other Western states 
have also attempted to influence discussions of chemi-
cal weapons deployments by publishing their own 
analyses.36 
 
 
 
pageID=238&nid=51301. In late 2016, Russia also declared 
in connection with the battle for Aleppo that its own investi-
gation had proven chemical weapons use by non-state actors: 
“Exclusive: Sputnik Reports From Terrorist Chemical Factory 
in Aleppo”, Sputnik International (online), 29 December 2016, 
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201612291049117057-
aleppo-chemical-weapons-production/ (both accessed 2 March 
2017). 
36 Shortly before the publication of the UN report on the 
chemical attacks of 21 August 2013, the US State Department 
published its own assessment based on US intelligence: see 
e.g. David Jolly, Scott Sayare and Rick Gladstone, U.S. Releases 
Detailed Intelligence on Syrian Chemical Attack (Paris, 30 August 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/world/middleeast/ 
syria.html (accessed 29 November 2016). 
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Controlling WMD in Areas of Limited Statehood 
“I think ‘normal’ doesn’t apply  
under the current conditions.”37 
 
For missions in areas of limited statehood, the rules 
and procedures set out in non-proliferation regimes 
have to be adapted to conditions of acute crisis. This 
process often takes place under great time pressure. 
Occasionally, this requires the relaxation or the 
tightening of standards. Such a politically delicate 
decision is further complicated by the question of 
who has the legitimacy to take such decisions.38 
Practical Prerequisites: Logistics and Security 
Frequently, with joint disarmament projects in areas 
of limited statehood there is either lack a counterpart 
in the target state or such a partner is unable or un-
willing to cooperate. Such an uncooperative environ-
ment requires additional logistical efforts from non-
proliferation organisations. 
The transport of personnel and equipment into 
the zone of operations cannot be conducted entirely 
by commercial providers, as would often be the case in 
routine operations. It is thus advantageous if the mis-
sion can build on the long-term presence of inspectors 
on-site. From such an operational base in the mission 
area or a neighbouring country, staff can keep in touch 
with the central government, arrange inspections 
and carry out other verification activities.39 Communi-
cations in the crisis zone as well as between head-
quarters and staff deployed in the field must be tap--
proof. Sensitive information should also be compart-
mentalised.40 
 
37 The Special Coordinator of the UN-OPCW Joint Mission, 
Sigrid Kaag, on 1 November 2013, in reply to the question 
whether the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons should 
not normally be carried out in the possessor state: see “Inter-
view: Head of OPCW-UN Team Awaits Next Steps on Destruction of 
Syria’s Chemical Weapons”, United Nations News Centre (online), 
1 November 2013 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
NewsID=46396#.WE8LUrnNj4x (accessed 12 December 2016). 
38 See Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 15. 
39 The activities to disarm Syria’s chemical weapons, for 
example, relied on an operational base in Beirut, an opera-
tions centre in Jordan and an OPCW liaison bureau in 
Damascus: see ibid., 20. 
40 Cf. ibid., 13. 
The first priority is to assure the safety of the staff 
in area of operation, as the following examples show. 
When UN inspectors attempted, three days after the 
event, to clarify the circumstances of the devastating 
chemical weapons attacks on 21 August 2013, they 
came under fire in rebel-controlled territory.41 And 
on 27 May 2014, members of the OPCW fact-finding 
mission went to investigate an alleged chlorine gas 
attack by Syrian government troops on the opposition-
held city of Hama. One of their vehicles was damaged 
by an explosive device; two other cars were briefly 
detained by the rebels. In both cases, the inspections 
had been cleared in advance with the government and 
the opposition.42 
Clarifying the legal conditions for a mission in a 
crisis zone starts with arranging the appropriate in-
surance and protection of staff and their families.43 
Additionally, the OPCW only sent volunteers as inspec-
tors to Syria. The OPCW preferred staff with relevant 
military training and knowledge of the host country’s 
language and culture.44 
Since disarmament organisations have no armed 
personnel for missions in crisis zones, they collaborate 
with professional security providers, for instance from 
the United Nations. These providers can offer security 
analyses, brief staff on the ground on the security 
situation, prepare inspectors for their task, and try to  
 
41 The mission leader later reported that they had interpreted 
the shots as a warning signal that was only to be expected 
and therefore continued with their investigation: see “Mod-
ern Warfare. Interview with Åke Sellstrom, Chief UN Weap-
ons Inspector in Syria”, CBRNe World, (February 2014), 8–13 (9), 
http://www.cbrneworld.com/_uploads/download_magazines/ 
Sellstrom_Feb_2014_v2.pdf (accessed 2 March 2017). 
42 Only one of the inspectors was slightly hurt: see OPCW, 
Security Incident Affects Syria Fact-Finding Mission (The Hague, 
27 May 2014), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/security-
incident-affects-syria-fact-finding-mission/ (accessed 27 April 
2017). 
43 Cf. Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 11. 
44 Cf. ibid., 8. 
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Table 
Mechanisms for elimination and verification of Syria’s chemical weapons programme  
and investigating alleged chemical weapons use in Syria 
 Period Task Mandate 
UN Secretary-General Mechanism since 21 Mar 2013 Investigating alleged 
biological and chemical 
weapons use  
UN General Assembly, Reso-
lution 42/37 C (1987); UN Secu-
rity Council, Resolution 620 
(1988); decision of the UN 
Secretary-General 
Routine OPCW verification  since 14 Sep 2013  Verifying compliance with 
CWC provisions 
Syria’s accession to CWC 
UN-OPCW Joint Mission 16 Oct 2013 – 
30 Sep 2014 
Elimination of Syria’s 
declared chemical weapons 
stocks 
UN Security Council, Resolu-
tion 2118 (2013) 
OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM) since 29 Apr 2014 Investigating alleged 
chemical weapons use  
Decision of the OPCW Director-
General 
OPCW Declaration Assessment 
Team (DAT) 
since April 2014 Resolving “anomalies and 
discrepancies” in Syria’s 
declarations  
Decision of the OPCW Execu-
tive Council  
UN-OPCW Joint Investigative 
Mechanism (JIM) 
since 7 Aug 2015 Identifying those 
responsible for alleged 
chemical weapons use 
UN Security Council, Resolu-
tions 2235 (2015), ff. 
 
protect them in the area of operations.45 Under the 
Joint Investigative Mechanism, the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral and the OPCW Director-General jointly assess the 
security situation and decide whether to carry out an 
inspection.46 To guarantee medical and emergency 
care on-site, it is usually necessary for the disarmament 
organisation to cooperate with the UN and local part-
ners. 
 
45 In Libya, the United Nations Support Mission (UNSMIL) pro-
vided logistical support, security and communications for the 
OPCW inspectors: see United Nations Security Council, Letter 
Dated 23 March 2012 from the Chairman of the Security Council Com-
mittee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011) Concerning 
Libya Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2012/178 
(New York, 26 March 2012), 7, http://www.securitycouncil 
report.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96 
FF9%7D/Libya%20S%202012%20178.pdf (accessed 6 May 2016). 
46 OPCW, Summary Report of the Work of the OPCW Fact-Finding 
Mission in Syria Covering the Period from 3 to 31 May 2014, Note 
by the Technical Secretariat, S/1191/2014 (16 June 2014), 6, 
http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S_series/2014/en/s-1191-
2014_e_.pdf (accessed 2 March 2017). 
Expanding Existing Procedures: 
Gathering and Using Information 
Normally, compliance with non-proliferation and dis-
armament obligations is verified on the basis of infor-
mation provided by the state party to the treaty. This 
information is verified through on-site inspections, 
remote sensing technologies and – to a limited extent 
– open sources.47 
However, these instruments are not very effective 
if the possessor state has no or limited access to the 
relevant areas or facilities. Moreover, governments 
involved in civil wars lack necessary administrative 
capacities and/or willingness to provide international 
organisations with relevant information. 
Early on, the OPCW tightened and expanded obliga-
tions on Syria. After Syria had acceded to the CWC on 
14 September 2013, the OPCW Executive Council and 
UN Security Council, referring to the urgency of the 
 
47 Cf. Oliver Meier and Iris Hunger, “‘Open Sources’ und 
Verifikation: Die Demokratisierung der Rüstungskontrolle?”, 
in Medien zwischen Krieg und Frieden, ed. Ulrich Albrecht and 
Jörg Becker, 1st ed., Schriftenreihe der Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung e.V., vol. 29 (Baden-
Baden, 2002), 223–41. 
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situation, suspended the 30-day period which nor-
mally has to pass before the convention’s provisions 
apply.48 This amounted to a reinterpretation of the 
CWC. Syria submitted its first declaration even before 
it had become a CWC state party.49 
The OPCW also obliged Syria to disclose more infor-
mation than can normally be required from member 
states. For example, Damascus had to provide early 
declarations of its chemical weapons stockpiles (and 
their destruction) to minimise the risk of weapons 
being hidden.50 Moreover, the OPCW demanded that 
Syria declare any research facilities (which normally 
are not declarable under the CWC) that were part of 
the chemical weapons programme.51 
When running missions in crisis zones, disarma-
ment organisations also use new instruments to 
acquire information. In Libya, the OPCW as early as 
2011 started acquiring commercial satellite imagery 
for its verification activities. Since the OPCW only has 
limited capacities for analysing such imagery, it co-
operated with a number of other international organi-
sations.52 The OPCW thus expanded its own remote-
sensing abilities. Since 2013, it has used such sources 
of information for other tasks as well. It also increas-
ingly incorporated open sources into its verification 
activities before and during the mission in Syria.53 
The development of new verification instruments 
is remarkable (see table, p. 15). In April 2014, only six 
months after Syria had submitted its first declaration 
 
48 Cf. Walter Krutzsch, Eric Myjer and Ralf Trapp, “Issues 
Raised by the Accession of Syria to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention”, in The Chemical Weapons Convention, ed. Krutzsch 
et al. (see note 30), 689–701 (690). 
49 Ibid., 695. 
50 Jean P. Zanders, “Using the Momentum of Syria’s Chemi-
cal Weapons Dismantlement and Identifying Spill-Over Poten-
tials. Discussion Note Prepared for: Academic Peace Orchestra 
– Middle East (APOME), ‘Tackling the Middle East WMD/DVs 
Arsenals in the Context of Military Asymmetries Towards 
Zonal Disarmament’, Berlin, 11–12 March 2015”, The Trench 
(online), 13 March 2015, http://www.the-trench.org/me-spill-
over-effects/ (accessed 2 March 2017). 
51 Cf. Krutzsch et al., “Issues Raised” (see note 48), 696–670. 
52 Importantly, it received support from the UN Institute for 
Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Appli-
cations Programme (UNOSAT) and the EU: see Trapp, Lessons 
Learned (see note 32), 18. In February 2015 the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the OPCW 
agreed to collaborate more closely on using such data: OPCW, 
OPCW and CTBTO Heads Meet to Strengthen Cooperation (The Hague, 
23 February 2015), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-
and-ctbto-heads-meet-to-strengthen-cooperation/ (accessed 
27 April 2017). 
53 Cf. Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 18. 
to The Hague,54 the OPCW sent a team of experts to 
Damascus to verify whether the Syrian declarations 
were correct and complete. This team developed into 
the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), whose task 
was to identify “anomalies and discrepancies” in the 
Syrian declarations.55 In about a dozen consultations 
with the government in Damascus, the OPCW team 
brought facts to light which clearly demonstrated that 
Syria’s declarations about its own chemical weapons 
capacities were neither complete nor correct.56 
As part of several corrections and additions to its 
own declarations, Syria submitted “late declarations” 
of a chemical weapons production facility as well as 
three research and development facilities.57 Three 
years on, the process of verifying Syria’s chemical 
weapons activities is still incomplete.58 One of the 
significant discoveries made by the DAT is that Syria 
was working on ricin, a toxin whose misuse is pro-
hibited under the BWC and the CWC.59 
Syria claims that its incomplete and faulty declara-
tions are the result of negligence and a lack of admin-
istrative capacities. Russia, as an ally of the Syrian gov-
ernment, takes a similar stance and argues that the 
 
54 See OPCW, Syria Submits Its Initial Declaration and a General 
Plan of Destruction of Its Chemical Weapons Programme (The Hague, 
27 October 2013), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/syria-
submits-its-initial-declaration-and-a-general-plan-of-destruction- 
of-its-chemical-weapons-pro/ (accessed 14 December 2016). 
55 Cf. Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 8. 
56 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 26 October 2015 from the 
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2015/820 (New York, 26 October 2015), http://www.un.org/ 
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/820 (accessed 
21 January 2016). 
57 Cf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2015. Armaments, Disarmament and Inter-
national Security (Oxford, 2015), 583. Eleven of the 12 declared 
production facilities for chemical weapons have now been 
destroyed. The security situation has so far made it impos-
sible to eliminate the twelfth: UN Security Council, Letter 
Dated 26 October 2015 (see note 56). 
58 For example, in October 2016 Syria reported to the OPCW 
that CWC-relevant activites had taken place at the Scientific 
Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), a state research and de-
velopment facility. However, the OPCW continues to criticise 
this declaration as incomplete: see OPCW Executive Council, 
Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Pro-
gramme. Note by the Director-General, EC-84/DG.11 (The Hague, 
24 January 2017), http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ 
EC/84/en/ec84dg11_e_.pdf (accessed 21 February 2017). 
59 See Gunnar Jeremias, Mirko Himmel, Tomisha Bino and 
Jakob Hersch, “Spotlight on Syria’s Biological Weapons”, 
Arms Control Wonk (online), 8 February 2016, http://www. 
armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201010/guest-post-spotlight-
on-syrias-biological-weapons/ (accessed 2 March 2017). 
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“problem” of Syria’s chemical weapons has been 
“solved” with the elimination of declared stocks. By 
contrast, others, especially Western states accuse 
Syria of deliberately concealing its chemical weapons 
arsenal.60 In March 2016, the Executive Council of the 
OPCW tasked the Director-General with directly con-
tacting the Syrian authorities to clarify the outstand-
ing issues.61 
Partner or Enemy? 
Dealing with Non-State Actors 
Since 9/11 (if not before), the risk of a terrorist attack 
with radiological or nuclear weapons has been high 
on the list of possible threats. Terrorist groups can also 
threaten disarmament missions in areas of limited 
statehood. The so-called Islamic State has, over an ex-
tended period, controlled a territory in which tech-
nologies and experts that could be used to produce 
radiological, biological or chemical weapons are pres-
ent. This is a first for a financially powerful, inter-
nationally active terrorist organisation.62 The OPCW 
has confirmed that the IS is capable of producing mus-
tard gas and has already used it in Iraq and Syria.63 
Nevertheless, operations to control WMD in crisis 
zones can require a certain level of coordination or 
even cooperation with non-state groups. This is true, 
for example, when such groups control territories or 
facilities that are relevant for the disarmament mis-
sion. But even actors with no such governance role 
 
60 See e.g. Alexandra Sims, “Isis Has ‘Made and Deployed 
Chemical Weapons’, Says US Intelligence Official”, Independ-
ent, 10 February 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/middle-east/isis-has-made-and-deployed-chemical-
weapons-says-us-intelligence-official-a6864821.html (accessed 
16 December 2016). 
61 Cf. Daniel Horner, “OPCW Pressing Syria on Declaration Gaps”, 
Arms Control Association (online), 29 March 2016, http://www. 
armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_04/News-Briefs/OPCW-Pressing-
Syria-on-Declaration-Gaps (accessed 29 November 2016). 
62 Cf. Chris Quillen, “The Islamic State’s Evolving Chemical 
Arsenal”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 11 (2016): 1019–
1030. 
63 OPCW, Director-General Expresses Concern over Alleged Recent 
Chemical Attacks in Iraq (The Hague, 23 March 2016), http:// 
www.opcw.org/news/article/director-general-expresses-
concern-over-alleged-recent-chemical-attacks-in-iraq/; Anthony 
Deutsch, “Exclusive: Samples Confirm Islamic State Used 
Mustard Gas in Iraq – Diplomat”, Reuters, 23 March 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-
chemicalweapons-idUSKCN0VO1IC (both accessed 20 March 
2017). 
have the potential to disrupt and influence the secu-
rity situation. Therefore, it may be necessary to seek 
an understanding with them. Because international 
disarmament regimes were primarily designed to deal 
with the threat of state-sponsored WMD programmes, 
they have no procedures for this kind of interaction. 
Practically speaking, cooperation with non-state 
or substate actors is dependent on different prerequi-
sites. First, the relevant actors must be interested in 
working with international non-proliferation organi-
sations.64 Opposition groups in control of a territory 
might want to prove that they have no interest in 
acquiring or possessing WMD. In 2015, for instance, 
the Kurdish regional government in Iraq backed an 
OPCW investigation of the chemical attacks on the 
Peshmerga65 to prove that the IS was responsible for 
these crimes. Non-state actors may also be genuinely 
interested in eliminating WMD if they fear that such 
agents might fall into the hands of their enemies or 
might be released accidently or as a result of military 
engagements. 
Second, the authorisation of the central govern-
ment on whose territory the non-proliferation organi-
sation intends to act has up to now been a precondi-
tion for such missions.66 UN inspectors thus had to 
withdraw from their deployment base in late May 
2013 when Damascus refused permission to investi-
gate alleged chemical attacks on rebel-held territory.67 
To cite another example: although the Iraqi central 
government has no actual control over the Kurdish 
parts of Iraq, the OPCW in August 2015 was able to 
investigate chemical weapon use against the Pesh-
merga only after Baghdad had given its consent.68 
 
64 See e.g. Heike Krieger, A Turn to Non-State Actors: Inducing 
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law in War-Torn Areas 
of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series 
no. 62 (Berlin, June 2013), 18, http://www.sfb-governance.de/ 
publikationen/working_papers/wp62/SFB-Governance-
Working-Paper-62.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). 
65 See Julian E. Barnes, “Chemical Weapons Group Says It 
Is Open to Investigation of Iraq Mustard Agent Claims”, Wall 
Street Journal, 14 August 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
chemical-weapons-agency-says-it-is-open-to-investigation-of-
iraq-mustard-agent-claims-1439560750 (accessed 28 August 
2015). 
66 Cf. Krieger, A Turn to Non-State Actors (see note 64), 18–19. 
67 See Chris Schneidmiller, “Barred from Syria, Advance U.N. 
Chemical Weapons Investigators Retreat From Staging Point”, NTI 
(online), 23 May 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/barred-
syria-advance-un-chemical-weapons-investigators-retreat-
staging-point/ (accessed 20 March 2017). 
68 See “Kurds Say Investigating Suspected Islamic State 
Chemical Attack in Iraq”, Reuters, 26 February 2016, http:// 
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Third, the practical conditions for cooperation have 
to be established. Contact between non-proliferation 
organisations and non-state actors can be politically 
delicate. But on the operational level, such interaction 
has generally been surprisingly straightforward. Co-
operating with humanitarian NGOs active on the 
ground may be unproblematic from a legal perspec-
tive – and it may also be necessary, if only to inform 
such organisations about the risks associated with a 
disarmament operation.69 
While investigating the chemical weapons attacks 
in the Ghouta area in August 2013 the UN negotiated 
several ceasefires with the Syrian government and 
rebel groups to facilitate inspections.70 For the dura-
tion of their investigations, UN staff were under the 
care of the rebels, before returning to government-
controlled territory. 
The OPCW Fact Finding Mission (FFM), deployed 
in 2014 to clarify whether alleged chemical weapons 
attacks had taken place, also had to contact represen-
tatives of armed non-state groups, since all alleged 
chemical weapons attacks had occurred in areas out-
side the Syrian government’s sphere of influence. The 
OPCW inspectors agreed procedures with these actors 
for investigating the incidents and in addition col-
laborated with a non-state organisation in selecting 
potential witnesses of the chemical weapons attacks.71 
Fourth, non-state actors must possess a minimum 
of international legitimacy if they are to form part of 
a cooperative effort to control WMD. Terrorist groups 
such as the IS cannot be a partner in the verification 
and destruction of WMD. The governments involved 
in eliminating chemical weapons in Syria avoided a 
highly political debate over the legitimacy of non-state 
groups by not even referring to the topic in bodies 
such as the OPCW Executive Council. 
 
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-chemical 
weapons-idUSKCN0VZ23B (accessed 20 March 2017). 
69 See Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32). 
70 United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 
Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the 
Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Alleged 
Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 Au-
gust 2013, A/67/997–S/2013/553 (New York, 16 September 2013), 
6, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_553.pdf (accessed 
20 March 2017); “Modern Warfare. Interview with Åke Sell-
strom” (see note 41). 
71 Cf. OPCW, Summary Report (see note 46), 3, 5. 
Pay as You Go: Ad-Hoc Funding of 
Disarmament Missions 
Fragile states are often not willing to pay for disarma-
ment measures, even if this is a treaty obligation. 
Syria, for example, refused to pay for the destruction 
of its own chemical weapons. It only covered the costs 
of eliminating a few comparatively innocuous pre-
cursors, destroying chemical weapons production 
facilities, transporting weapons within the country, 
and some associated security measures.72 Libya also 
made other nations pick up most of the expenses 
for eliminating and removing its chemical weapons. 
Most of the time, the funds for such crisis opera-
tions have to be covered by voluntary extrabudgetary 
contributions, raised from interested member states. 
The UN and OPCW established trust funds in 2013 
to support the UN-OPCW Joint Mission.73 Financing 
mission in areas of limited statehood often requires 
substantial expenditures at short notice. For the acqui-
sition of the equipment needed to eliminate Syria’s 
chemical weapons, the OPCW added a sum to its budget 
that was twice the sum available in a regular annual 
procurement budget.74 Given the importance of the 
disarmament mission for security policy, the OPCW 
has so far had no problems in raising the necessary 
funds, even though such money has frequently been 
slow to actually arrive. By September 2015, member 
states had allocated 50 million US dollars for the trust 
fund to finance the elimination Syria’s chemical weap-
ons.75 Contributions in kind by states parties have been 
more problematic because such equipment often did 
not meet operational requirements. 
 
72 See Philipp C. Bleek and Nicholas J. Kramer, “Eliminating 
Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Implications for Addressing Nu-
clear, Biological, and Chemical Threats”, The Nonproliferation 
Review 23, no. 1 1–2 (2016): 197–230 (212). It was initially 
unclear whether Syria would have to reimburse the costs that 
accrued: see Krutzsch et al., “Issues Raised” (see note 48), 698. 
73 For an overview of the first funds, see OPCW-UN Joint Mis-
sion in Syria, Status of Contributions to the OPCW-UN Joint Mission 
in Syria, 17 February 2014, http://opcw.unmissions.org/Link 
Click.aspx?fileticket=Yw0vVMzJwvw=&tabid=205 (accessed 
20 March 2017). 
74 Cf. Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 19. 
75 Cf. ibid., 6. 
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Making Rules Flexible: 
Disarming under Time Pressure 
Disarmament of WMD in areas of limited statehood 
often poses a dilemma for decision-makers: the goal of 
removing proliferation-relevant materials as quickly 
as possible from a crisis zone must be weighed against 
the principle of upholding established and strict stand-
ards for safety, security and verification. 
The way in which the United States handled Iraq’s 
chemical weapons after the invasion in 2003 demon-
strates the importance of following procedures for 
accounting, securing and destroying weapons stock-
piles in a transparent manner. As occupying powers, 
the United States and United Kingdom were obliged 
to respect the CWC provisions. Instead, they failed to 
notify the OPCW of abandoned Iraqi chemical weap-
ons and destroyed some of them by circumventing 
CWC procedures. Terrorist groups later acquired some 
of the stocks that had not been declared and not been 
destroyed and used these weapons in attacks against 
US troops and others.76 
 
76 Investigative journalists brought these violations to 
light only years later. A spokeswoman for the US Department 
of Defense justified the improvised destruction of chemical 
weapons in Iraq by claiming that the CWC “did not foresee” 
a situation like that of Iraq. However, since the CWC obliga-
tions apply even to occupying powers, her argument is diffi-
cult to accept: see Ralf Trapp and Paul Walker, “Article IV: 
Chemical Weapons”, in The Chemical Weapons Convention, ed. 
Krutzsch et al. (see note 30), 119–50 (122–26); C. J. Chivers, 
“The Secret Casualties of Iraq’s Abandoned Chemical Weap-
ons”, in: New York Times, 14 October 2014, http://www. 
nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleeast/us-
casualties-of-iraq-chemical-weapons.html (accessed 26 May 
2015). At the CWC States Party Conference in 2010, Iran had 
already levied accusations against the United Kingdom and 
United States that their chemical weapons destruction in 
Iraq in 2003 had violated the treaty. London and Washington 
unanimously rejected the criticism. They argued that under 
such unusual circumstances, following the CWC procedures 
would have delayed destruction of the chemical weapons 
and would have increased the risk of proliferation to terrorist 
groups. Such a development, they argued, would have contra-
dicted the purpose of the CWC treaty: see OPCW, The Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s View and Concern over the Discovery and Destruc-
tion of Chemical Weapons by the United States and the United King-
dom in Iraq, C-15/NAT.1 (The Hague, 29 November 2010), 
http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-15/national-
statements/CSP15_Iran-Concerns_en.pdf; OPCW, Statement 
by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak United States Permanent Represen-
tative at the Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties 
(The Hague, 29 November 2010), http://www.opcw.org/ 
fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-15/national-statements/c15nat03_ 
USA_en.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017); OPCW, Response by 
Thus, disregarding treaty procedures can pose a 
risk. At the same time, strict implementation of the 
letter of such rules may lead to delays and the closing 
of a “window of opportunity”. 
In reality, rules have often been reinterpreted or 
ignored entirely.77 Such a flexible approach to the 
elimination of Syrian chemical weapons was possible 
because the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the CWC 
states parties and the members of the UN Security 
Council largely agreed that urgent action was vital 
against the backdrop of civil war. The basis of the mis-
sion was the framework agreement signed on 14 Sep-
tember 2013 by US Secretary of State John Kery and 
his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, which laid 
down important elements for the future disarmament 
process.78 Spurred on by the two great powers, the 
OPCW Executive Council and UN Security Council sub-
sequently found that the exceptional situation neces-
sitated “special procedures for the expeditious destruc-
tion of [Syria’s] chemical weapons programme” under 
“stringent verification”. Disarmament should occur 
“in the soonest and safest manner”, according to the 
diplomatic expression chosen by the UN Security 
Council for its resolution.79 
Very soon after Syria submitted the first declaration 
on its chemical weapons programme to the OPCW on 
20 September 2013, it became clear to those in charge 
of the disarmament mission that it was not going to 
be possible to destroy the entire stockpile on Syrian 
territory. Given the security situation, protecting a de-
struction facility would have required the long-term 
deployment of forces on the ground. At the time, no 
nation was willing to commit such forces.80 
 
the United Kingdom to a Request for Clarification Submitted under 
Article IX, Paragraph 2, of the Chemical Weapons Convention (The 
Hague, 30 November 2010). 
77 Busch and Pilat, “Disarming Libya?” (see note 18). 
78 Cf. Bleek and Kramer, “Eliminating Syria’s Chemical 
Weapons” (see note 72), 206–207. 
79 Cf. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2118 (2013), 
S/RES/2118 (2013), (New York, 27 September 2013), http:// 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/ 
2118(2013) (accessed 17 March 2017 See also the slightly 
earlier and similar decision of the OPCW Executive Council, 
Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons. Decision, EC-M-33/DEC.1 
(The Hague, 27 September 2013), http://www.opcw.org/ 
fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33dec01_e_.pdf (accessed 
20 March 2017). 
80 In 2012, US assessments concluded that it would have 
taken 50,000 to 60,000 combat troops on the ground to 
secure and disarm Syria’s chemical weapons in the country 
itself, even after a complete collapse of the central govern-
ment: see Mark Hosenball and Phil Stewart, “Securing Syria 
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On 15 November 2013, the OPCW Executive Council 
therefore decided that most of Syria’s chemical weap-
ons would be destroyed outside of the country. This 
was a deviation from the CWC, which provides for 
destruction of all chemical weapons on the territory 
of the possessor state. The treaty prohibits chemical 
weapon transfers.81 The Executive Council further 
“dictated”82 the destruction timetable, whereas nor-
mally the possessor state would submit a destruction 
plan, which would then need to be approved by the 
OPCW. 
The OPCW employed innovative processes and 
technologies to verify chemical weapons destruction. 
Syrian troops transporting chemical weapons to Lata-
kia to be removed by ship were remotely monitored. 
Containers were secured with (electronic) seals and 
GPS transmitters. Even the destruction of a Syrian 
chemical weapon facility was remotely monitored, 
after the OPCW had equipped Syrian soldiers with 
helmet-mounted video cameras and communication 
devices.83 
 
Chemical Weapons May Take Tens of Thousands of Troops”, 
Reuters, 16 August 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/08/16/syria-crisis-chemicalweapons-idUSL2E8JG74320 
120816 (accessed 17 August 2012). 
81 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
[= Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)], Article I.1(a); cf. 
Krutzsch et al., “Issues Raised” (see note 48), 691. Only 133 
tonnes of isopropanol, a precursor of chemical weapons 
production, were destroyed by Syria: see Bleek and Kramer, 
“Eliminating Syria’s Chemical Weapons” (see note 72), 212. 
The negotiating history of the CWC strongly supports the 
argument that the transfer ban applies without exception. 
For instance, a German proposal to create an exception in the 
CWC that would enable transfers for the purpose of chemical 
weapons destruction failed: see Robert A. Friedman, “Legal 
Aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Contin-
gencies”, The Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 1–2 (2016): 61–82 
(64). There are two precedents for the transfer of chemical 
weapons to another nation for destruction under the CWC: 
the transport of three old chemical weapons from Austria 
to Germany in 2007 and of one old chemical weapon from 
Belgium to the Netherlands in 2013. However, in neither case 
was there any risk of proliferation since these were World 
War I weapons: see Friedman, “Legal Aspects”, ibid., 68–69, 
and cf. Krutzsch et al., “Issues Raised” (see note 48), 699. 
82 Cf. Friedman, “Legal Aspects” (see note 81), 73. 
83 The OPCW also uses remote-sensing technologies to en-
sure that disarmed production sites for chemical weapons 
are not used for prohibited activities: see Edith M. Lederer, 
“Watchdog: All Syrian Chemical Facilities to Be Destroyed 
This Summer. In New Report to UN, OPCW Chief Says Remote 
Monitoring System Will Ensure Locations Not Used Again”, 
The Times of Israel (online), 3 March 2015, http://www. 
No nation was willing to host facilities for the 
destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. 
The most dangerous agents were therefore rendered 
harmless on the US Navy vessel Cape Ray, on the high 
seas. To some degree, the hydrolysis (breaking down 
chemicals through a reaction with water) of the around 
600 tonnes of precursors of the nerve agent sarin and 
of 20 tonnes of mustard gas, and the destruction of 
the hydrolysis residues in Germany, Finland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, took place in a legal 
grey area.84 Who was in “control” over the chemical 
weapons stocks at the various transport stages outside 
of Syria? Who was their rightful “owner”? Who would 
bear the costs resulting from an accident? Several gov-
ernments involved in the destruction process took 
substantial legal risks because not all these questions 
had been resolved before Syria’s chemical weapons 
were eliminated.85 
Syria did not remain the only example of the OPCW 
and UN Security Council authorising the transfer of 
chemical weapons outside the possessor state.86 In Feb-
ruary 2016, Italian media reported fights over a stor-
age facility for chemical weapon precursors of Libya’s 
former chemical weapons programme.87 There was 
 
timesofisrael.com/watchdog-all-syrian-chemical-facilities-to-
be-destroyed-this-summer/ (accessed 7 November 2016). 
84 See Cheryl Pellerin, 75 Percent of Syria Chemical Materials 
Reported Destroyed, Washington, D.C., 11 August 2014, http:// 
archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122898 
(accessed 1 December 2016). 
85 Cf. Friedman, “Legal Aspects” (see note 81), 65–66. For a 
good summary of the other adaptations of the CWC to the 
Syrian situation, see Zanders, “Using the Momentum” (see 
note 50). 
86 As early as 2003, the US had transferred Libyan gas cen-
trifuges abroad without giving the IAEA the opportunity to 
inspect the relevant facilities, thus disregarding IAEA pro-
cedural provisions. However, London and Washington had 
coordinated their actions with the IAEA: see Paul Kerr, “U.S. 
Says Libya Implementing WMD Pledge”, Arms Control Today 34, 
no. 2 (March 2004), http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2004_ 
03/Libya (accessed 27 April 2017). 
87 After its accession to the CWC in 2004, Libya declared 
around 25 tonnes of mustard gas. The destruction of these 
weapons and other precursors was about half-finished in 
2011. The Libyan transitional government discovered after 
the fall of Gaddafi that his regime had kept further stocks 
secret, including 517 artillery shells filled with mustard gas 
and eight 250-kg bombs. From mid-November 2013 to late 
January 2014, the usable mustard-gas stocks were destroyed 
in the country under OPCW supervision, in a facility supplied 
by the United States, and with international financial sup-
port. The precursors initially remained in Libya. For security 
reasons these substances were later destroyed outside the 
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even a report that some chemical weapons stockpiles 
had fallen into the hands of IS and other terrorist 
groups.88 As early as 2011, the Libyan government had 
asked the OPCW for assistance with removing declar-
able warfare agents. Until 2016, however, this was 
only partially achieved, partly for security reasons. 
On 22 July 2016, the UN Security Council empow-
ered member states 
“to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy 
chemical weapons identified by the Director-General 
of the OPCW, consistent with the objective of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the elimi-
nation of Libya’s chemical weapons stockpile in the 
soonest and safest manner, with appropriate consul-
tations with the Government of National Accord”.89 
The Security Council thus supported a similar decision 
taken by the OPCW Executive Council two days ear-
lier.90 It was also agreed that the Libyan government 
remained the “owner” of its chemical weapons until 
the moment of destruction, but that it ceded control 
over these weapons as soon as they left Libyan terri-
tory.91 On 27 August 2016, a Danish ship finally 
brought about 400 tonnes of chemical weapons pre-
cursors from Misrata to Germany.92 These were to be 
 
country: see Terrell et al., “Eliminating Libya’s WMD Programs” 
(see note 16), 190–91. 
88 See Lee Gancman, “Ex-Libyan Intel Official: IS Has Gaddafi-
era Chemical Weapons”, The Times of Israel (online), 26 January 
2016, http://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-libyan-intel-official-is-
has-gaddafi-era-chemical-weapons/; Bhaswati Mukherjee, 
“Threat of Chemical Weapons. Have Remnants of Gaddafi’s 
Hidden Stockpiles Fallen into Jihadi Hands?”, The Tribune 
(online), 8 May 2015, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/ 
comment/threat-of-chemical-weapons/77516.html (both 
accessed 20 March 2017). 
89 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2298 (2016), 
S/RES/2298 (2016), (New York, 22 July 2016), para. 3, http:// 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2298 (accessed 20 March 
2017). 
90 Cf. OPCW Executive Council, Destruction of Libya’s Remaining 
Chemical Weapons. Decision, EC-M-52/DEC.1 (The Hague, 20 July 
2016). The Security Council and OPCW might possibly have 
been able to do without this authorisation by referring to the 
Syrian precedent of destruction outside of the possessor state. 
91 Cf. OPCW, Plan for the Destruction of Libya’s Remaining 
Category 2 Chemical Weapons Outside the Territory of Libya. Note by 
the Director-General, EC-M-53/DG.1 (The Hague, 19 August 2016), 
para. 11, http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-53/ 
en/ecm53dg01_e_.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). 
92 See Abdulkader Assad, “400 Tons of Libyan Chemical 
Weapons Transferred to Germany”, The Libya Observer, 28 
August 2016, http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/400-tons-
destroyed (like the residues from the destruction of 
Syria’s mustard gas stocks in 2014-2015) in the facility 
for disposing of chemical warfare agents in Munster.93 
New Procedures: 
Investigating Chemical Weapons Uses 
Investigating allegations of biological or chemical 
weapons use is one of the most daunting arms control 
challenges. At the same time, reliable investigation 
results are a prerequisite for any decisive reaction by 
the international community to cases of non-com-
pliance. 
It is an indication of the political sensitivity of such 
investigations that treaty-based mechanisms have hardly 
been used to clarify such serious violations of the core 
prohibitions. There have been only two requests (in 
Romania and North Korea) for an IAEA special inspec-
tion, which the Agency can conduct to examine sus-
picious facilities outside of routine safeguards inspec-
tions.94 
Under the CWC provisions, any state party can 
request a so-called challenge inspection if it suspects 
that another CWC state party is producing or pos-
sessing chemicals for prohibited purposes. The Con-
vention also includes solid and extensive procedures 
for investigating the alleged use of chemical weapons, 
which come close to the ideal of “anywhere, anytime” 
verification.95 To date, however, no state party has 
requested a challenge inspection. Reasons include the 
fact that non-compliance allegations are often based 
on intelligence findings and states want to protect the 
sources of such information. Moreover, the accusing 
state might be concerned that its request fails or that 
it might become the target of retribution. If the subse-
quent investigation does not yield any reliable results, 
the accused state might appear to be the “winner” in 
the dispute.96 
 
libyan-chemical-weapons-transferred-germany (accessed 
20 March 2017). 
93 See Christian Thiels, “Deutschland entsorgt Gaddafis 
Giftgas-Erbe”, tagesschau.de, 8 August 2016, http://www. 
tagesschau.de/inland/chemiewaffen-libyen-101.html (accessed 
20 March 2017). 
94 Cf. Olli Heinonen, “IAEA Inspections in Perspective”, Nonprolif-
eration Policy Education Center (NPEC) (online), 23 May 2012, 
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1180&tid=4 (accessed 
16 December 2016). 
95 See CWC (see note 81), Article IX. 
96 Cf. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Verifying the Chemical Weapons 
Ban: Missing Elements”, Arms Control Today 37, no. 1 (January 
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Against this background, it is all the more surpris-
ing that three international investigations are being 
or have been carried out in civil-war Syria to establish 
whether chemical weapons were used, and if so how 
and by whom. The first investigation is based on a 
section of the CWC’s verification annex which estab-
lishes a connection between the convention and the 
so-called UN Secretary-General Mechanism. This 
mechanism was created in 1987 against the backdrop 
of chemical weapons use by Iraq. It authorises the UN 
Secretary-General to investigate breaches of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, 
toxic or similar gases or biological agents in war. 
Under the mechanism, the UN Secretary-General is 
authorised to deploy a group of inspectors from UN 
member states to investigate accusations of prohibited 
uses of chemical or biological weapons. Any UN mem-
ber state can request such an investigation and the 
Secretary-General can approve it without Security 
Council consent. This instrument closes a gap particu-
larly in the BWC, which – unlike the CWC – does not 
have a verification mechanism.97 However, the Secre-
tary-General Mechanism remains separate of the BWC. 
Attempts to establish it as an instrument for investi-
gating violations of the biological weapons treaty have 
so far failed. 
The CWC supports the Secretary-General Mecha-
nism by stipulating that the OPCW will work closely 
with the UN Secretary-General to investigate alleged 
use of chemical weapons involving states not party to 
the CWC or “a territory not controlled by a State Party”. 
On request, the OPCW will put “its resources at the 
disposal” of the UN Secretary-General.98 
In March 2013, the Syrian government requested 
then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to investigate 
an alleged chemical weapons use in Khan al Assal, 
which had occurred on 19 March of that year. The 
Secretary-General approved Syria’s request on 21 
March. On the same day, France and the United King-
 
and February 2007): 6–13, http://www.armscontrol.org/ 
act/2007_01-02/Tucker#Sidebar1 (accessed 20 March 2017). 
97 Prior to the Syria mission, the mechanism had been acti-
vated twice, in Mozambique and Azerbaijan, both in 1992: see 
United Nations Information Service, Frequently Asked Questions 
about the United Nations Mission to Investigate the Allegations of the 
Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Prepared by 
the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNIS/INF/489 
(Vienna, 13 September 2013), http://www.unis.unvienna.org/ 
pdf/2013/FAQs_about_the_UN_Mission_to_investigate_the_ 
alleged_use_of_chemical_weapons_in_Syria.pdf (accessed 
18 November 2016). 
98 CWC (see note 81), Annex 2, Part XI, Article (27). 
dom requested that the possible use of chemical 
weapons by the Syrian government at other locations 
be included in the investigation.99 In consultation 
with the OPCW and the World Health Organisation, 
Ban appointed 15 experts to form an inspection team. 
The team was expected to be available to begin an on-
site investigation with 48 hours’ notice. 
On 14 August 2013, after lengthy discussions, the 
Syrian government and the UN agreed on the scope 
and terms of the inspections. The inspectors arrived 
in Damascus on 18 August 2013 to investigate three 
alleged cases of chemical weapons use. 
Three days after the team’s arrival, on 21 August, 
the biggest chemical weapons attack since 1988 oc-
curred in the Ghouta region, near Damascus. At least 
several hundred people were killed by the nerve agent 
sarin. After an emergency session of the UN Security 
Council on 22 August, its President demanded an 
immediate, thorough and impartial investigation of 
the incident. The UN Secretary-General sent the UN’s 
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Angela 
Kane, to Damascus to clarify with the Syrian govern-
ment the possibilities for investigating the Ghouta 
area attacks. By 25 August, Kane had obtained such 
an agreement, and the next day the experts began to 
conduct on-site inspections. On 31 August they re-
turned to the OPCW headquarters in The Hague. 
The mission leader, Åke Sellstrom, submitted his 
provisional report to the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council on 16 September. This is still the 
most important source on the 21 August events. The 
report concludes that great quantities of sarin were 
deployed via artillery rockets.100 It contains no state-
ments on the perpetrators, even though many experts 
believe that the circumstances point to the Syrian gov-
ernment. 
Reports on chemical weapons use in Syria con-
tinued to come in after the attacks of 21 August. In 
April 2014, the OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü 
reacted by establishing a Fact Finding Mission (FFM), 
something the CWC does not provide for. The FFM is 
tasked with investigating which reports of chemical 
weapons use after 21 August 2013 are true. The mis-
 
99 Ban Ki-Moon, “Press Encounter on Syrian Government 
Request Statement”, UN Web TV (online), 21 March 2013, 
http://webtv.un.org/topics-issues/un-secretary-general/watch/ 
ban-ki-moon-press-encounter-on-syrian-government-request/ 
2241903792001#full-text (accessed 20 March 2017). 
100 See United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, 
Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area 
(see note 70). 
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sion’s mandate does not include identification of 
those responsible for such attacks. 
Despite carrying out its investigations under the 
most difficult of circumstances, the FFM had submitted 
a total of seven reports by mid-2017.101 These are based 
on various sources of information: FFM staff analysed 
media reports, and interviewed victims and doctors 
(in part via telephone and Skype), for example. Some-
times, it also had access to biomedical, soil and other 
samples. The FFM presence in Damascus proved useful 
in organising the investigations. In its reports, the 
mission refers to 116 alleged cases of chemical weap-
ons use in Syria that took place between April 2014 
and January 2016. The OPCW has investigated 29 of 
these incidents and concluded that it is highly likely 
that toxic chemicals – mainly chlorine gas or mustard 
gas – were used as warfare agents in 23 of them.102 
In June 2017, the FFM confirmed that Sarin had 
been used during an attack on 4 April at the rebel-held 
Khan Shaykhun, which killed more than 80 people 
and injured hundreds.103 This OPCW investigation 
took place under immense scrutiny because it had 
been the first confirmed use of sarin since the 21 
August 2013 attacks. Following the attack, Western 
members of the Security Council drafted a resolution 
demanding detailed information from the Syrian 
government in order to clarify the circumstances of 
the release of chemical warfare agents. After the US 
 
101 The FFM reports can be found here: Organisation for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Fact-Finding Mission 
Reports, https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria/fact-
finding-mission-reports, (accessed 6 July 2017). 
102 United Nations Security Council, First report of the Organi-
zation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint 
Investigative Mechanism, S/2016/142, paragraph 42, http://www. 
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/142&referer= 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53291&Lang=
E (accessed 6 July 2017). 
In late 2016, the FFM submitted a report on its investigation 
of a further incident. However, it was unable to confirm the 
Syrian government’s claim that opposition groups had killed 
six people with a chemical weapons attack in Aleppo on 
2 August 2016: see United Nations Security Council, Report of 
the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding the Incident of 
2 August 2016 as Reported in the Note Verbale of the Syrian Arab 
Republic Number 69 Dated 16 August 2016. S/2017/45, S/1444/2016 
(21 December 2016) https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N17/011/93/DOC/N1701193.DOC (accessed 4 April 
2017). 
103 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding 
an alleged incident at Khan Sheykhun, Syrian Arab Republic 
April 2017, https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/Fact_ 
Finding_Mission/s-1510-2017_e_.pdf (accessed 6 July 2017). 
airstrike on a Syrian air force base on 6 April, how-
ever, the resolution was not put to the vote.104 
Of the three instruments for verifying chemical 
weapons and investigating their use in Syria, the 
OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) has 
the most ambitious mandate. The JIM was created on 
7 August 2015 by the UN Security Council “to identify 
to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, 
groups, or governments who were perpetrators, 
organisers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use 
of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any 
other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic”.105 
Russia had for some time blocked a decision to 
establish the mechanism, in an apparent attempt to 
avoid singling out the Assad regime as the focus of 
investigations. Moscow therefore insisted that reports 
of IS having used chemical weapons against Kurdish 
troops in Northern Iraq were also to be included in the 
investigation.106 The Security Council unanimously 
decided to establish the JIM once Baghdad had agreed 
to an OPCW investigation into attacks on Kurdish 
forces.107 
The activities of the JIM, which began in November 
2015, are limited to cases in which the FFM “deter-
mines or has determined” that they “involved or likely 
involved the use of chemicals as weapons”.108 The com-
mission initially investigated nine incidents where 
chemical weapons had been used between between 
April 2014 and August 2015. These cases had been 
 
104 “Syria: Briefing and Vote on Draft Resolution on the Use 
of Chemical Weapons”, What’s in Blue (online), 7 April 2017, 
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2017/04/syria-briefing-and-vote-
on-a-resolution-on-the-use-of-chemical-weapons.php; “UNSC 
Puts Off Consideration of Draft Resolutions on Syria – 
Russia’s Mission”, TASS, 7 April 2017, http://tass.com/politics/ 
939896 (both accessed 7 April 2017). See also See Gordon, 
Michael R., Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, “Dozens 
of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria”, New York Times, 6 April 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/ 
middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-
chemical-attack.html?mcubz=1 (accessed 6 July 2017). 
105 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2235 (2015), 
adopted by the Security Council at its 7501st meeting, on 
7 August 2015, S/RES/2235 (2015), (New York, 7 August 2015), 
para. 5, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp? 
symbol=S/RES/2235(2015) (accessed 3 June 2017). 
106 See Anna Cara, “US Idea to Lay Blame in Syria Chlorine 
Attacks Gets Support”, ABC News (online), 7 May 2015, http:// 
abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/us-idea-lay-blame-syria-
chlorine-attacks-support-30887925 (accessed 11 May 2015). 
107 See Deutsch, “Exclusive: Samples Confirm Islamic State 
Used Mustard Gas in Iraq” (see note 63). 
108 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2235 (2015) 
(see note 105). 
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selected, inter alia, because they seemed less difficult 
to resolve than other comparable cases. 
In August and October 2016 the then-head of the 
JIM, Virginia Gamba,109 submitted two reports to the 
Security Council. The JIM concluded that the Syrian 
government was responsible for three attacks with 
chlorine, and IS for one attack with mustard gas.110 
This marks the first time the international community 
has identified an institution or organisation that used 
chemical weapons or was involved in their use. The 
JIM is attempting to assign individual responsibility 
for such crimes.111 
On 17 November 2016 the Security Council extend-
ed the JIM’s mandate for an additional year. The deci-
sion had been preceded by a bitter argument between 
Russia and the Western permanent members of the 
Security Council. Moscow criticised the JIM’s work as 
being “biased” and suggested expanding its mandate 
to include investigating alleged use of chemical weap-
ons by non-state actors in the region. Simultaneously, 
Russia rejected Western proposals to make the JIM’s 
findings the basis for investigations by the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC).112 Under the ICC’s 
Rome Statute, “employing asphyxiating, poisonous 
 
109 See “Experten sollen Giftgas-Angriffe in Syrien prüfen”, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 August 2015, http://www.sueddeutsche. 
de/politik/chemiewaffen-experten-sollen-giftgas-angriffe-in-
syrien-pruefen-1.2625575 (accessed 20 March 2017). 
110 Cf. United Nations Security Council, Third Report of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations 
Joint Investigative Mechanism, S/2016/738 (New York, 24 August 
2016), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol= 
S/2016/738; United Nations Security Council, Fourth Report of 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United 
Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, S/2016/888 (New York, 
21 October 2016), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. 
asp?symbol=S/2016/888 (accessed 20 March 2017). 
111 “UN-OPCW Panel Seeks Names of Syrian Commanders 
in Gas Attacks Probe”, AFP, 17 February 2017, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/afp/2017/02/syria-conflict-chemical-un-
warcrimes.html; Anthony Deutsch, “Exclusive: Assad Linked 
to Syrian Chemical Attacks for First Time”, Reuters, 13 January 
2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
chemical-weapons-idUSKBN14X1XY (both accessed 21 Febru-
ary 2017). 
112 One day before the extension of the JIM’s mandate, 
Russia withdrew its signature from the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court because of the Court’s supposed 
“partiality”: see Ivan Nechepurenko and Nick Cumming-
Bruce, “Russia Cuts Ties with International Criminal Court, 
Calling It ‘One-Sided’”, The New York Times, 16 November 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/world/europe/russia-
withdraws-from-international-criminal-court-calling-it-one-
sided.html?_r=0 (accessed 18 November 2016). 
or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices” is a war crime.113 Whilst Syria has not signed 
the Statute, the Security Council can still refer war 
crimes carried out in non-member states to the Court. 
This would clear the way for a criminal prosecution.114 
The investigation of the 4 April 2017 Khan Shay-
khun attack has now also been turned over to the JIM, 
which will attempt to identify the perpetrators. 
 
 
 
113 United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, A/CONF.183/9 (17 July 1998), http://legal.un.org/icc/ 
statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (accessed 3 June 2017). 
114 Cf. Scott Spence and Meghan Brown, Syria: International 
Law and the Use of Chemical Weapons (London, 8 August 2012), 
http://www.vertic.org/pages/posts/syria-international-law-and-
the-use-of-chemical-weapons-345.php (accessed 9 December 
2016). 
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As Few Rules as Necessary, as Much Preparation as Possible: 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Even in areas of limited statehood, non-proliferation 
regimes provide the most effective instruments to con-
trol WMD. Military interventions to secure and destroy 
WMD are risky and not very promising. Few, if any, 
governments appear willing to provide troops for such 
missions.115 It remains to be seen whether the US air-
strike on the Sheirat air force base on 6 April 2017 will 
deter the Syrian armed forces from using chemical 
weapons again.116 An assessment of multilateral efforts 
to control WMD in crisis zones, thus has to take into 
account the lack of alternatives. 
Current efforts to control chemical weapons in the 
Middle East have obvious limits and shortcomings. 
Syria remains in non-compliance with the CWC. The 
OPCW has not yet been able to determine that the 
Syrian chemical weapons stockpile has been compre-
hensively and irreversibly eliminated.117 There are 
worrying indications that the government in Damas-
cus has continued to work on nerve agents, even after 
the destruction of declared chemical weapons had 
been completed, and that IS is producing mustard 
gas.118 The frequency of chemical weapon attacks 
occurring in Syria has led some to warn of a “new 
normal”.119 Those responsible for the attacks have 
 
115 See e.g. Martin B. Malin, “The Effectiveness and Legitimacy 
of the Use of Force to Prevent Proliferation”, in Arms Control in 
the 21st Century. Between Coercion and Cooperation, ed. Oliver Meier 
and Christopher Daase (New York, 2013), 81–122. 
116 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by 
President Trump on Syria” (Mar-a-Lago, Florida, 6 April 2017), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/06/ 
statement-president-trump-syria (accessed 24 April 2017). 
117 The US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, declared in 
April 2017 that the United States had no doubt that Syria 
was violating the CWC because it still possessed chemical 
weapons: see Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Syria Still Has Chemical 
Weapons, U.S. Defense Secretary Says”, The Washington Post 
(online), 21 April 2017, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/syria-still-has-chemical-weapons-says-us-defense-
secretary/2017/04/21/2fc71740-267a-11e7-b503-9d616bd5a305_ 
story.html?utm_term=.68b59ac6b615 (accessed 24 April 2017). 
118 Cf. Amy E. Smithson, “Assad’s Phony Farewell to 
Arms”, Foreign Affairs (online), 26 October 2016, http://www. 
foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-10-26/assads-phony-
farewell-arms (accessed 20 March 2017). 
119 Kathleen Fallon, Natasha Kieval, Zaher Sahloul et al., A 
New Normal: Ongoing Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria (Canfield, 
been identified only in a few cases. So far, it has not 
been possible to refer any of the allegations to the 
International Criminal Court.120 This impunity might 
encourage copycats, leading to chemical weapons 
being used in other civil wars as well. 
Despite these deficiencies, the achievements in 
Syria are important and remarkable. The elimination 
between 2013 and 2015 of approximately 1,300 tonnes 
of nerve agents has prevented the use of these weap-
ons or the loss of control over them.121 The Syrian 
chemical weapons programme no longer poses a stra-
tegic threat to Israel.122 Any remains of the Libyan 
chemical weapons programme relevant for prolifera-
tion have now been removed from the country. The 
facts and circumstances surrounding the horrendous 
21 August 2013 chemical attacks in the Ghouta area 
have been largely established. The UN and OPCW have 
proven that chemical weapons have been used dozens 
of times since these attacks.123 For the first time, those 
 
Ohio: Syrian American Medical Society, February 2016), 
http://www.sams-usa.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ 
A-New-Normal_Ongoing-Chemical-Weapons-Attacks-in-Syria. 
compressed.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). The US justified 
its military strike against Syria on 6 April 2017 inter alia by 
stating that the use of chemical weapons against civilians in 
Syria and elsewhere must not become “the new normal”: see 
Statement by Ambassador Kenneth D. Ward, United States Delegation 
to the Executive Council, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (The Hague, 13 April 2017), http://www.opcw.org/ 
fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-54/en/United_States_ECM54_ 
Statement.pdf (accessed 24 April 2017). 
120 Cf. Colum Lynch, “Push to Sanction Syria for Using 
Chemical Weapons Hits Russian Resistance”, Foreign Policy 
(online), 27 September 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/ 
09/27/push-to-sanction-syria-for-using-chemical-weapons-hits-
russian-resistance/ (accessed 11 November 2016). 
121 The destruction process was completed in early 2016: 
OPCW, Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons Completed (The 
Hague, 20 January 2016), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/ 
destruction-of-syrian-chemical-weapons-completed/. 
122 In September 2013, against this backdrop, then-Israeli 
President Shimon Perez considered for the first time the pos-
sibility that Israel might acceed to the CWC: see “Peres: Israel 
Will Consider Joining Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty”, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/30/us-israel-chemical-
idUSBRE98T0CS20130930 (accessed 11 March 2014). 
123 See “Interview: The Syrian Forces and ISIL Used Toxic 
Chemicals as Weapons – Report”, UN News Service, 30 August 
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responsible for several attacks have been identified. 
The JIM has investigated nine cases of chemical weap-
ons use in 2017 alone.124 This paves the way for a 
possible criminal prosecution. 
Prospects: Future Trends, Regional Hot Spots, 
Gaps in Regulations 
There are two regions in the world where the overlap 
between proliferation and areas of fragile statehood 
is particularly great. In the Middle East, state disinte-
gration has accelerated and spread since 2011. Many 
regional states possess WMD or the capacity (or at 
least the necessary expertise) to develop or produce 
such weapons because they either have or had pro-
grammes to develop nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons. All military uses of chemical weapons since 
World War Two have taken place in the Middle East. 
Many states in the region implement global non-pro-
liferation norms only partially or not at all.125 Finally, 
IS is a regional non-state actor that has already used 
WMD locally and could also use them outside the 
region.126 
In Asia, there is also a risk of states losing control 
over WMD. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, but 
controls only part of its territory. Transnational ter-
rorist networks use Pakistan as a safe haven and have 
had contacts right at the centre of its nuclear pro-
gramme.127 Areas of limited statehood where WMD 
are present could develop in North Korea, too, should 
there be a national crisis or an armed conflict on the 
peninsula. It must be assumed that the United States 
and China would directly intervene to secure nuclear 
weapons in case of a national crisis in North Korea or 
 
2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 
54795#.V8ghVTUzjIV (accessed 20 March 2017). 
124 “Syria: Briefing and Vote on Draft Resolution” (see note 
104). In addition, the JIM is investigating the Khan Shaykhun 
incident. 
125 See, e.g., WMD Arms Control in the Middle East. Prospects, Ob-
stacles and Options, ed. Harald Müller and Daniel Müller (Farn-
ham and Burlington, 2015). 
126 See Marine Pennetier, “Islamic State Could Launch Gas 
Attacks beyond Syria: OPCW Official”, Reuters, 23 November 
2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
mustardgas-idUSKBN13I1CZ (accessed 24 November 2016). 
127 Cf. Oliver Thränert and Christian Wagner, Pakistan as a 
Nuclear Power. Nuclear Risks, Regional Conflicts and the Dominant 
Role of the Military, SWP Research Paper 8/2009 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2009), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publication/pakistan-as-a-nuclear-power/ 
(accessed 5 June 2017). 
Pakistan. Nonetheless, multilateral regimes might also 
be needed in such a scenario to help prevent the pro-
liferation of relevant capacities.128 
However, proliferation issues could also arise in 
other regions, for instance in Africa. About 220 kilo-
grammes of highly enriched uranium from the apart-
heid regime’s dismantled nuclear weapons are stored 
to this day in a bunker at the nuclear research centre 
in Pelindaba, South Africa. Despite an attempted theft 
in November 2007 that nearly succeeded, and despite 
the United States’ considerable pressure on Pretoria, 
the South African government has so far not been 
willing to remove this material from the country.129 
Unconfirmed NGO reports on chemical weapons use 
by the Sudanese government show how important 
international investigations of such attacks in civil 
wars are.130 
Finally, in Europe, too, the territorial integrity of 
nations is at risk. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
the IAEA has not inspected the nuclear facilities there. 
In January 2015, the Kiev government and pro-Russian 
rebels accused each other of having used chemical 
weapons in Eastern Ukraine.131 
Gaps in regulations and implementation of existing 
rules exist above all in biological weapons control. No 
organisation verifies whether BWC states party com-
ply with the Convention’s provisions. Nor is there a 
formalised multilateral process for disarming nuclear 
 
128 Cf. Robert J. Peters, “The WMD Challenges Posed by a Collapse 
of North Korea”, 38 North (online), 14 April 2015, http://38north. 
org/2015/04/rpeters041415/ (accessed 20 March 2017). 
129 See Douglas Birch and Jeffrey R. Smith, “South Africa 
Rebuffs Repeated U.S. Demands That It Relinquish Its Nuclear Explo-
sives”, Center for Public Integrity (online), 14 March 2015, http:// 
www.publicintegrity.org/2015/03/14/16873/south-africa-
rebuffs-repeated-us-demands-it-relinquish-its-nuclear-
explosives (accessed 20 March 2017). 
130 Cf. Amnesty International, Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air. 
Sudanese Government Forces Ravage Jebel Marra, Darfur, (London, 
2016), http://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ 
AFR5448772016ENGLISH.PDF. For a critical evaluation of this 
report, see Jean P. Zanders, “Allegation of Chemical Warfare 
in Darfur”, The Trench (online), 1 February 2017, http://www. 
the-trench.org/darfur-chemical-warfare/ (both accessed 
20 March 2017). 
131 See “Donetsk Republic Says Kiev Used Chemical Muni-
tions in Attack on Airport”, Tass, 16 January 2015, http://tass. 
ru/en/world/771579; “Kyiv Verifying Reports that Militants 
Used Chemical Weapons at Donetsk Airport”, Interfax-Ukraine, 
24 January 2015, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/ 
246601.html (both accessed 20 March 2017). Although both 
Russia and the Ukraine are CWC members, neither has 
requested a challenge inspection. 
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weapons.132 This could be a problem if WMD disarma-
ment in North Korea becomes an acute issue.133 
Adapting Non-Proliferation Regimes 
The international body of rules governing WMD con-
trol is a legal basis and an important normative point 
of reference for disarmament processes – particularly 
in areas of limited statehood and crisis zones. Even if 
the central government is not willing or able to im-
plement multilaterally agreed rules, the procedures 
set out in non-proliferation regimes can help to ex-
pose incomplete disarmament, enable members of the 
international community to verify the correctness of 
disarmament results, and maintain high safety and 
security standards.134 
Multilateral institutions also provide spaces for 
shaping international opinion and forging multilat-
eral consensus. Many of the UN Security Council’s 
decisions on eliminating Syria’s and Libya’s chemical 
weapons were prepared in the OPCW. The outcome 
of OPCW Executive Council consultations – where 
no state has a veto – may have had greater legitimacy 
than the results of deliberations in the Security Coun-
cil. Moreover, the expertise that exists in international 
organisations was indispensable for overcoming dif-
ficulties in the practical implementation of the dis-
armament processes. 
The OPCW has begun to tackle new challenges of a 
world shaped by continuing crisis. Its Director-General 
Üzümcü described the arrangements for disarming 
Syria’s declared chemical weapons stocks and the 
novel instruments used (such as the FFM, DAT and JIM) 
as a “new paradigm” for the OPCW’s work. This new 
approach, he declared, could also be applied to other 
 
132 The IAEA did verify the disarmament of South Africa’s 
atomic weapons programme in the early 1990s. However, 
the Agency only began its verification after the actual dis-
mantling of the warheads had taken place: see Olli Heinonen, 
“Lessons Learned from Dismantlement of South Africa’s Bio-
logical, Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons Programs”, The Non-
proliferation Review 23, no. 1–2 (2016): 147–62. 
133 Cf. Bleek et al., “Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion” (see note 9), 22. 
134 See Oliver Meier, Chemiewaffen in Syrien. Wie sich die Bedro-
hung verringern lässt, SWP-Aktuell 36/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2013), http://www.swp-berlin. 
org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2013A36_mro.pdf 
(accessed 20 March 2017). 
countries, for instance Iraq or Libya.135 For him, given 
the changed geopolitical situation, “business as usual” 
is no longer an option. The OPCW (and others) have 
thus raised expectations that they will be able to sig-
nificantly contribute to WMD control in similar 
cases.136 
There is broad consensus among states parties that 
non-proliferation regimes have to be better tailored 
to the task of reducing the risk of WMD proliferation, 
including in areas of limited statehood. Views on how 
to adapt them, however, vary significantly according 
to each state’s specific interests. Thus, Russia and China 
are concerned that granting international organisa-
tions new authority could undermine the principle 
of non-interference in internal affairs. Other govern-
ments also view the adaptive approach with scepti-
cism, worrying that it might lead to a loss of political 
control. These differences regarding the future devel-
opment of the OPCW have created a deep rift between 
member states that could compromise its ability to 
act.137 
This rift was exacerbated by a dispute over how 
best to react to the chemical weapons attack of 4 April 
2017. Russia in particular criticised the OPCW for 
being “partial” because of its statements documenting 
the use of sarin in Khan Shaykhun. Moscow also ac-
cused the FFM of not having verified Russian evidence 
of the use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups. 
Russia and Iran demanded that a new expert commis-
sion be deployed to investigate the attack in Khan 
Shaykhun and pursue the US claim that chemical 
weapons were being stored at Syria’s Shayrat air-force 
base.138 The majority of the OPCW Executive Council 
 
135 Ahmet Üzümcü, “Keynote Speech by Director-General 
Ahmet Üzümcü”, Ljubljana, 9 May 2016, http://www.opcw. 
org/fileadmin/OPCW/ODG/uzumcu/160509_DG_Speech_to_ 
NATO_WMD_Conference.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). 
136 Cf. Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 2. 
137 On 11 November 2016, the OPCW Executive Council took 
a decision – with a narrow two-thirds majority and against 
Chinese, Iranian, Russian and Syrian opposition – to condemn 
Syria’s treaty violations. Thus, the OPCW was unable to re-
spond to this substantial non-compliance case on the basis of 
a consensus decision. This rift within the international com-
munity could further weaken the norm against chemical 
weapons: see Céline Barmet and Oliver Thränert, Syria and the 
Chemical Weapons Ban, Policy Perspectives, 4/8 (Zurich, Novem-
ber 2016), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP4-8.pdf 
(accessed 21 February 2017). 
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rejected their motion.139 The evident politicisation of 
OPCW investigations, however, is a heavy burden for 
future chemical weapons control efforts.140 
States parties are often reluctant to provide addi-
tional resources to strengthen international non-pro-
liferation regimes. Structural problems, such as the 
competition between various international organisa-
tions for resources and tasks, put additional hurdles 
on the path to reform. 
There are two possible (and in part already recog-
nisable) approaches to ensure that the international 
community will be better able to manage future chal-
lenges of controlling WMD in areas of limited state-
hood. The first (and conservative) strategy aims to 
preserve existing initiatives, rules and mechanisms as 
well as those established more recently, over the past 
few years. For example, a complex patchwork of agree-
ments and cooperations has been established in the 
context of the Syria mission. The actors involved, driven 
by the urgency of controlling WMD on the ground in 
the fastest manner possible, stitched together this 
patchwork in a step-by-step, ad hoc manner and with-
out having a clear vision of the ultimate end state. 
This spontaneously developed body of rules could be 
reactivated, at least in part, to tackle future crises. 
Such a conservative approach has the advantage that 
no new mechanisms would need to be established. 
 
Council (The Hague, 13 April 2017), http://www.mid.ru/en/ 
foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ 
content/id/2727332 (accessed 24 April 2017). 
139 Only six nations (Algeria, China, Iran, Russia, South 
Africa and Sudan) supported the proposal. The other mem-
bers of the 41-members of the Executive Council either voted 
against establishing another commission or abstained: see 
OPCW, Report of the Fifty-Fourth Meeting of the Executive Council, 
EC-M-54/2 (20 April 2017), http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/ 
OPCW/EC/M-54/en/ecm5402_e_.pdf (accessed 24 April 2017). 
140 The FFM confirmed in June 2017 that sarin or a sarin-like 
substance had been used in the Khan Shaykhun attack. The 
case was then passed on to the JIM, whose staff will try to 
identify the perpetrators. After having briefed the Security 
Council on 6 July, the head of the JIM, Edmond Mulet, com-
plained about the “politicisation” of the JIM’s work. He said 
that the investigators “do receive – unfortunately – direct and 
indirect messages all the time from many sides telling us how 
to do our work. And some of those messages are very clear in 
saying that if we don’t do our work according to them – these 
different visions – then they will not accept the conclusions 
of our work.” He appealed to the international community 
to let the team do its work “in an impartial, independent 
and professional manner.” See Al-bab.com, Chemical weapons 
in Syria: statement by head of investigative team, 6.7.2017, http:// 
al-bab.com/chemical-weapons-syria-statement-head-
investigative-team (accessed 9 July 2017). 
Governments retain their freedom to act because no 
new legal norms are created. The downside of this 
approach: the legitimacy and effectiveness of existing 
instruments will have to be re-established in each new 
crisis. This provides powerful states with an opportu-
nity to object to the application of these mechanisms 
on the basis of real (or opportunistic) practical or legal 
grounds. In addition, over time some of the existing 
instruments are likely to be perceived as less relevant 
or effective. 
By contrast, a second (and progressive) approach 
would aim to codify, strengthen and expand those 
instruments that have proved effective during the 
most recent operations to control WMD in areas of 
limited statehood. Any gaps in the body of rules could 
then be closed by creating new mechanisms and in-
struments. This approach would require the willing-
ness to establish new generic rules and procedures 
for WMD control. Such an approach would need to be 
based on the states parties’ willingness to accept some 
limits on their freedom to act in acute crises. This 
applies particularly to the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council. 
In reality, it will be essential to strike the right bal-
ance between the two approaches. The motto should 
be: “As few rules as necessary, as much preparation 
as possible”.141 There are four issue areas in which 
improvements would be meaningful – prevention, 
contingency planning, inclusion of non-state stake-
holders and political support for measures to control 
WMD in areas of limited statehood. 
Reinforcing Prevention 
Prevention is the most effective and, in the long term, 
the most efficient way to reduce the risk of prolifera-
tion-relevant materials falling into the wrong hands 
 
141 Matthew Hoisington lists three options under inter-
national law for dealing with spaces that have little or no 
effective governance. For him, the conservative-orthodox 
approach, which consists of applying existing rules, is in-
adequate because it chases after the “phantom” of an existing 
state. He considers the second approach, of aiming to succes-
sively adapt legal standards to the new situation, logical in 
principle but risky in that it might create new rationales for 
intervention. Instead, Hoisington recommends a third ap-
proach: a radical redefinition of the law in areas of limited 
statehood, which takes as its starting point the existing, 
many-layered power relations in such areas: see Matthew 
Hoisington, “Toward an International Law for Ungoverned 
Spaces”, Global Governance 20, no. 4 (2014): 491–98. 
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during crises and in failing states. Three episodes 
illustrate the point. On 11 June 2014, IS captured the 
former Iraqi chemical weapons production facility 
Al-Muthanna.142 This is where artillery shells and 
hundreds of tonnes of chemical warfare agents, whose 
disposal was considered too dangerous and costly, had 
been stored in two bunkers since 1994. In July 2014, 
about 40 kilogrammes of low-enriched uranium from 
a research laboratory at Mosul University fell into 
the hands of IS during its capture of the city.143 Since 
2012, armed rebel groups in Syria had gained control 
over large chlorine stocks from at least two civilian 
facilities, and may have misused these agents for 
chemical weapons attacks.144 Notwithstanding the 
differences among these cases: had the international 
community reacted earlier, proliferation risks could 
have been reduced.145 
Multilateral non-proliferation regimes make an 
important, albeit limited, contribution to prevention. 
The IAEA mandate is restricted to preventing a misuse 
of civilian nuclear energy programmes.146 There exists 
 
142 Iraq became a state party to the CWC on 12 February 
2009 and had declared two bunkers to the OPCW, in accord-
ance with procedures under the Convention. On 7 July 2014, 
the Iraqi ambassador to the UN notified the UN Secretary-
General that Iraq had lost control of the facility. However, 
the chemical warfare agents stored there were most probably 
no longer usable: see Jean P. Zanders, “Threat Posed by Islamic 
State’s Capture of Iraq’s Muthanna CW Site”, The Trench 
(online), 29 September 2014, http://www.the-trench.org/al-
muthanna-cw-site-capture/; idem, “What’s He Building in 
There?”, CBRNe World, (August 2014), 8–12, http://www. 
cbrneworld.com/_uploads/download_magazines/Zanders.pdf 
(both accessed 20 March 2017). 
143 See Julian Borger, “The Mosul Mystery: The Missing Ura-
nium and Where It Came from”, The Guardian (online), 13 July 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-borger-
global-security-blog/2014/jul/13/iraq-nuclear-mosul-uranium-
isis; Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: Iraq Tells U.N. that ‘Terror-
ist Groups’ Seized Nuclear Materials”, Reuters, 9 July 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/09/us-iraq-security-
nuclear-idUSKBN0FE2KT20140709 (both accessed 20 March 
2017). 
144 Cf. United Nations Security Council, Third Report of the 
OPCW-UN JIM (see note 110), 10. 
145 Germany has contributed 2 million euros to support Iraq 
in eliminating any remaining chemical weapons. Iraqi ex-
perts were trained at a mobile laboratory in Germany, which 
was then delivered to Iraq in December 2015 to be used in the 
destruction of chemical warfare agents: see Jahresabrüstungs-
bericht 2015 (Berlin, 2016), 41, http://www.auswaertiges-amt. 
de/cae/servlet/contentblob/730798/publicationFile/215085/ 
160406_JAB_2015.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). 
146 Cf. Thomas E. Shea and Laura Rockwood, IAEA Verification 
of Fissile Material in Support of Nuclear Disarmament (Cambridge, 
(almost) no control or implementation mechanism for 
the BWC. The OPCW has successfully supervised the 
destruction of almost 92 percent of the 70,000 tonnes 
of chemical weapons declared globally. Programmes 
to improve the safety and security of nuclear, biologi-
cal and chemical facilities have been expanded for 
years.147 However, these programmes run into prob-
lems when donor countries limit their financial sup-
port or recipient countries are not (or no longer) 
willing to cooperate. 
Measures to safeguard weapons-grade and dual-use 
materials have to be expanded where statehood is at 
risk. It is also crucial to universalise multilateral re-
gimes. The focus should be on those crisis regions of 
the Middle East and Asia, where there is an especially 
high number of states that remain outside the BWC, 
CWC and NPT. Obligations to declare and eliminate 
existing capabilities become legally-binding only once 
a country has acceded to these treaties.148 
The OPCW, the IAEA and the Implementation Sup-
port Unit of the BWC should have a mandate to advise 
also those states that have not yet acceded to the re-
spective regime. For instance, it can be useful to give 
technical support for WMD control to a candidate 
state as soon as it has shown its political will to 
accede, in order to 
 familiarise political decision-makers with the 
regime’s rules and procedures; 
 discuss with officials how to apply these procedures 
under exceptional circumstances; and 
 reassure the other states parties that the treaty pro-
cedures can be swiftly implemented, once a state 
has acceded.149 
Improving Contingency Planning 
There will always be cases where prevention fails. 
Therefore, the international community needs to 
better prepare for crises in which control over WMD 
may be lost by improving risk monitoring, exercises 
 
Mass., May 2015), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ 
iaeaverification.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). 
147 “Security” here means the physical control over relevant 
substances and facilities, as distinct from safety programmes 
to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents at facilities. 
148 Conversely, the successful elimination of WMD from a 
crisis region can have a positive impact on the security calcu-
lations of other states: see “Peres: Israel Will Consider Joining 
Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty” (see note 122). 
149 Cf. Krutzsch et al., “Issues Raised” (see note 48), 697. 
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and other practical measures. As a first step, states 
parties and international organisations should syste-
matically analyse experiences gained during missions 
in areas of limited statehood.150 To date, lessons-
learned exercises have been primarily case-, topic- or 
organisation-specific. A broader exchange of experi-
ences could make it easier to draw more general con-
clusions from the various missions. 
Non-proliferation organisations usually operate on 
the basis of standard operating procedures. Foresight 
exercises could be useful in continually evaluating 
proliferation risks and preparing for the unexpected.151 
International organisations should also include non-
state parties in such monitoring activities. There are 
precedents for such activities. The Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) moni-
tors and analyses North Korea’s nuclear tests. And the 
OPCW had already gathered information about Syria’s 
chemical weapons programme before the country’s 
accession to the CWC, thus preparing itself for a mis-
sion there.152 
The OPCW wants to improve its internal contingen-
cy planning for crisis operations, so as to be in a posi-
tion to manage more than one chemical weapons 
exigency simultaneously.153 It also wants to develop 
a “surge capacity” to be able to conduct challenge or 
special inspections under CWC rules more quickly 
or to respond to a UN request faster.154 This should 
indeed be prioritised because missions in crisis 
regions absorb substantial resources: of all OPCW 
inspections conducted in 2014, around 26 percent 
were carried out to verify Syria’s chemical weapons 
 
150 Cf. Bleek et al., “Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion” (see note 9), 21. 
151 Cf. Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 3–4. 
152 The OPCW Director-General stated in an interview that 
the organisation had begun to prepare for “potential cases” 
in Syria even before March 2013. It was thus included in the 
US-Russian consultations on a framework agreement for elimi-
nating Syria’s chemical weapons, which was subsequently 
signed in Geneva on 13 September 2013. At the time, Syria 
was not yet a state party to the CWC: see Zanders, “‘After 
Syria’” (see note 33); Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 5. 
153 Cf. OPCW, Medium-Term Plan of the Organisation for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons 2017–2021, Note by the Technical 
Secretariat, C-21/S/1 (The Hague, 8 April 2016), para. 16, 
http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/83/en/ec83s01_ 
c21s01_e_.pdf (accessed 27 April 2017). 
154 Cf. idem, The OPCW in 2025: Ensuring a World Free of Chemi-
cal Weapons, Note by the Technical Secretariat, S/1252/2015 
(The Hague, 6 March 2015), para. 18(d), http://www.opcw.org/ 
fileadmin/OPCW/S_series/2015/en/s-1252-2015_e_.pdf (ac-
cessed 27 April 2017). 
programmes; in 2015 that figure was about 18 per-
cent.155 The OPCW has also established a core group of 
inspectors, who maintain a high level of training and 
would be rapidly deployable in a crisis. A core group 
of senior officials, which prepared and took important 
decisions during the Syria mission, could serve as a 
model for similar units in other organisations.156 The 
success of the Declaration Assessment Team should 
trigger discussions on how compliance reports could 
also be checked more quickly and comprehensively 
in other states for which the standard verification 
procedures are considered inadequate.157 Inspection 
procedures for suspicious facilities which were suc-
cessfully used in Syria could either become part of 
routine operations or they could be useful for future 
CWC challenge inspections.158 
Likewise, it would be sensible to develop flexible 
contingency plans, based on an inventory of existing 
competencies and capabilities in international organi-
sations and states.159 This mapping could then be used 
to draw up generic checklists of requirements for car-
rying out operations to control WMD in areas of lim-
ited statehood. 
Exercises are an especially important (but unfortu-
nately costly) instrument for preparing missions in 
crisis regions. This is particularly true of the UN Secre-
tary-General Mechanism, which has no permanent in-
spectorate, but instead selects inspectors from national 
lists of experts.160 
Ideally, the international community would main-
tain at its disposal institutional capacities which 
would be available in a crisis situation to swiftly and 
 
155 Cf. OPCW Executive Council, Draft Report of the OPCW on 
the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Devel-
opment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction in 2014. EC-79/5, C-20/CRP.1 (The Hague, 9 July 
2015), 3; OPCW Executive Council, Draft Report of the OPCW on 
the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Devel-
opment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction in 2015. EC-82/4, C-21/CRP.1 (The Hague, 14 July 
2016), 3. 
156 Cf. Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 5, 12. 
157 Cf. ibid., 16. 
158 Cf. Krutzsch et al., “Issues Raised” (see note 48), 698. 
159 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, The 
Secretary General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of 
Chemical, Bacteriological (Biological) or Toxin Weapons. A Lessons-
learned Exercise for the United Nations Mission in the Syrian 
Arab Republic (New York, May 2015), 9, https://unoda-web.s3-
accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/ 
publications/more/syrian-ll-report/syrian-ll-report-2015.pdf 
(accessed 20 March 2017). 
160 Cf. ibid., 9. 
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effectively control WMD.161 Such a pool of equipment 
and staff could be established so that various organi-
sations could access it when the need arises. So far, 
however, efforts to exploit synergies between various 
non-proliferation organisations have failed because of 
political hurdles and sensitivities.162 
The OPCW has found an innovative way of making 
use of funds left over from chemical weapons elimi-
nation efforts in Syria. In late 2015, states parties sus-
pended a rule under which a cash surplus had to be 
returned to treaty members. Instead, they established 
a Special Missions Fund, into which those funds will 
now flow as a reserve for financing unforeseen activ-
ities.163 
In general, such preventative measures are politi-
cally unpopular because decision-makers are reluctant 
to earmark funds for emergencies that may never 
actually occur. The UN Security Council could create 
stronger obligations for states to make such resources 
available by encouraging better prevention and con-
tingency planning. It could base such a requirement 
on Resolution 1540, which obliges all states to take 
measures to prevent terrorists from gaining control 
over WMD.164 
The Working Group on Preventing and Responding 
to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks of the United 
Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task 
Force’s (CTITF) is a further reference point for efforts 
to strengthen the contingency planning mandate of 
non-proliferation regimes. The UN Secretary-General 
created CTITF in 2005 to better connect the activities 
of 38 multilateral organisations and institutions 
 
161 The OPCW has also set up a Rapid Response Action Team, 
intended to support member states in case of a terrorist attack 
using chemical weapons: see OPCW Technical Secretariat, 
Establishment of a Rapid Response Assistance Team, S/1381/2016 
(The Hague, 10 May 2016), http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/ 
OPCW/S_series/2016/en/s-1381-2016_e_.pdf (accessed 28 No-
vember 2016). 
162 Cf. Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, Exploiting Synergies 
between Nonproliferation Verification Regimes: A Pragmatic Ap-
proach. Paper Presented at the International Safeguards Symposium: 
Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, 29 October – 
2 November 2001, IAEA-SM-367/15/06, http://www-pub.iaea.org/ 
MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%2015/ 
Paper%2015-06.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). 
163 See OPCW, Establishment of a Special Fund for OPCW Special 
Missions and Withholding of the Distribution of the Cash Surplus for 
2013, C-20/DEC.11 (The Hague, 3 December 2015), http://www. 
opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-20/en/c20dec11_e_.pdf (ac-
cessed 25 November 2016). 
164 Cf. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), 
S/RES/1540 (2004), (New York, 28 April 2004). 
which have relevant skills in terrorism prevention and 
counter-terrorism.165 The OPCW and IAEA jointly chair 
the task force. 
Finally, good contingency planning should also 
address the difficult issue of when conditions exist for 
ending the special treatment of an inspected state.166 
Including Stakeholders 
A study commissioned by the US Department of 
Defense looking at the challenges of WMD disarma-
ment in crisis zones concluded that “[s]tate-centric in-
ternational legal instruments that provide a basis for 
international engagement may be irrelevant where 
the actors in question are not parties.”167 However, this 
argument does not capture the fact that international 
organisations can hardly avoid interacting with non-
state groups during missions in crisis zones.168 
Politically, such cooperation is difficult since non-
state groups can at the same time be a spoiler or a gov-
ernance partner. Cooperating with armed non-state 
actors who control a specific territory poses a dilemma: 
such cooperation can elevate the political status of 
such groups, which in the long-term can complicate 
conflict resolution.169 Disputes about the legal status 
and political legitimacy of such actors frequently com-
plicate interactions. The principle of non-interference 
in a state’s internal affairs can also stand in the way 
of cooperation with such groups. 
Arms control in areas of limited statehood has so 
far been insufficiently debated from the perspective of 
 
165 However, the Working Group’s recommendations 
mainly refer to a better implementation of international 
obligations via national implementation legislation. The 
group also recommends intensified cooperation with a view 
to preparing for crises arising from CBRN attacks: see United 
Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force 
(CTITF), Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack 
Using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials. Report of the 
Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Attacks (New York, August 2011), http://www.opcw. 
org/fileadmin/OPCW/PDF/CTITF_2011_Report.pdf (accessed 
20 March 2017). 
166 Cf. Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 11. 
167 See Hersman, “Strategic Challenges” (see note 27), 39. 
168 Trapp, Lessons Learned (see note 32), 20ff. 
169 Ulrich Schneckener, Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging 
Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Govern-
ance Working Paper Series, 21 (Berlin, October 2009), 8, 18, 
http://www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen/working_papers/ 
wp21/SFB-Governance-Working-Paper-21.pdf (accessed 20 
March 2017). 
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how international law should evolve so that groups 
which find themselves at the “mezzanine”170 level 
between the nation-state and the population can be 
better integrated. International law contains elements 
which can be starting points for a structured discus-
sion on the conditions under which disarmament 
agencies should interact with non-state groups. Thus, 
in specific situations, the Geneva Convention holds 
armed non-state actors engaged in non-international 
armed conflict responsible for respecting the norms 
and rules of humanitarian international law.171 
Generic criteria for dealing with non-state actors 
would offer another possibility for lowering the politi-
cal hurdles for cooperation with such actors in the 
context of disarmament activities. Such criteria could 
be applied when arms non-state groups control a spe-
cific territory for extended periods of time and are in 
principle willing to cooperate. A list of criteria that 
would exclude any prospect for cooperation (e.g. if the 
group had been involved in crimes punishable under 
the ICC statute) could help put such decisions on a less 
subjective basis. The heads of relevant disarmament 
agencies or the UN Secretary-General could be author-
ised in advance to establish contacts with representa-
tives of relevant groups, whenever relevant conditions 
are met. 
It is also important to improve contacts with orga-
nisations that can influence the mission or improve 
public support for it. The OPCW, for instance, under-
estimated the strength of the NGO protests against the 
hydrolysis of chemical warfare agents onboard a US 
Navy transport ship and against the transshipment 
of Syrian warfare agents in an Italian port.172 
Conversely, it might be worth considering giving 
(certain) NGOs a way to initiate international investi-
gations into violations of existing prohibitions on the 
possession or use of WMD. The UN Security Council 
can already invite NGOs and individuals to testify 
 
170 Michael Crawford and Jami Miscik, “The Rise of the 
Mezzanine Rulers”, Foreign Affairs, (November/December 
2010), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-10-19/ 
rise-mezzanine-rulers (accessed 20 March 2017). 
171 One condition for applying the rules of humanitarian 
international law is that the groups in question must have 
the capacity to implement them: see Krieger, A Turn to Non-
State Actors (see note 64), 8–9. 
172 See Tom Kington, “Protests Grow in Italy as Syrian 
Chemical Weapons Are Shipped to Calabria Port”, The 
Telegraph, 1 July 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/europe/italy/10938708/Protests-grow-in-Italy-as-
Syrian-chemical-weapons-are-shipped-to-Calabria-port.html 
(accessed 11 December 2016). 
under the so-called “Arria formula”.173 In 2015, 
for example, Syrian doctors and NGOs powerfully 
described to the Council the impact of chemical 
weapons attacks on the civilian population.174 
Boosting the Role of the Security Council 
If a disarmament mission to an area of limited state-
hood is to succeed, the most important prerequisite is 
support by a unified international community. First 
and foremost, the UN Security Council needs to live 
up to its responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security. The Council is also a central venue 
for establishing the attitudes of important states and, 
where necessary, creating unity among them: 
 Under Article 103, obligations arising from of the 
UN Charter shall prevail over obligations stemming 
from any other international agreement.175 
 The Security Council can legitimise measures taken 
by individual member states (as it did in Libya in 
2011). Moreover, any measures decided under UN 
Charter Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Ag-
gression) can be backed up by sanctions.176 
 The Security Council can take decisions more quickly 
than consensus-seeking, multilateral non-prolifera-
tion regimes. 
 As a central authority and clearing house, the Secu-
rity Council can encourage or legitimise coopera-
tion between international organisations.177 For 
 
173 See United Nations Security Council, Background Note 
on the ‘Arria-Formula’ Meetings of the Security Council Members 
(New York, 2002), http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/ 
bgarriaformula.shtml (accessed 24 June 2015). 
174 See Somini Sengupta, “U.N. Security Council Sees Video 
Evidence of a Chemical Attack in Syria”, The New York Times, 
16 April 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/ 
middleeast/un-security-council-sees-video-evidence-of-a-
chemical-attack-in-syria.html?_r=1 (accessed 20 March 2017). 
175 Charter of the United Nations (New York, 1945), http://www. 
unric.org/en/charter. The Security Council used this power 
to legitimise the transfer of Syria’s chemical weapons: see 
Krutzsch et al., “Issues Raised” (see note 48), 699. 
176 For example, the elimination of Syria’s and Libya’s 
chemical weapons (Resolutions 2118 and 2298, respectively) 
were decided under Chapter VII: see Zanders, “Hybrid Dis-
armament Framework” (see note 15). 
177 An episode from the disarmament of Libya’s chemical 
weapons demonstrates the crucial importance of this clear-
ing house function. The destruction of Libya’s mustard gas 
stocks had to be interrupted in early 2011 because of a faulty 
component at a destruction facility. The necessary spare part 
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example, the Council can reduce political problems 
arising from different memberships of relevant 
organisations. 
The Security Council’s role in non-proliferation has 
steadily grown since 1992, when it stated for the first 
time that the proliferation of WMD constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security – and thus 
declared itself competent to address the issue.178 Since 
the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Council has im-
posed more and more sanctions in response to vio-
lations of non-proliferation rules.179 And with the 
adoption of Resolution 1540 in April 2004, it made the 
implementation of measures to control proliferation-
relevant technologies binding on all member states. 
As the final authority of non-compliance with non-pro-
liferation norms and rules, the Security Council has 
condemned such violations by Iraq, Iran and North 
Korea. 
Some observers take a critical view of the Security 
Council’s growing influence on the interpretation and 
adaptation of multilateral treaties, since states parties 
of the relevant regimes should decide on the develop-
ment of non-proliferation norms and procedures.180 
It would therefore be sensible to tie Security Council 
decisions more closely to multilateral non-prolifera-
tion regimes. 
For example, the Security Council could compel 
all states to refrain from commenting unilaterally on 
ongoing investigations into alleged uses of WMD. 
A more ambitious proposal is to make better use 
of the UN Secretary-General Mechanism to verify com-
pliance with the BWC.181 There have even been dis-
 
could not be imported because it was listed under the sanc-
tions imposed by the Security Council in March 2011: see 
Terrell et al., “Eliminating Libya’s WMD Programs” (see note 
16), 37. 
178 United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of 
the Security Council, S/23500 (New York, 31 January 1992). 
179 Cf. Michael Brzoska, “The Role of Sanctions in Non-prolif-
eration”, in Arms Control in the 21st Century, ed. Meier and Daase 
(see note 115), 123–45 (129–132). 
180 Cf. Harald Müller, Alexis Below and Simone Wisotzki, 
“Beyond the State. Nongovernmental Organizations, the 
European Union and the United Nations”, in Norm Dynamics in 
Multilateral Arms Control. Interests, Conflicts, and Justice, ed. Harald 
Müller and Carmen Wunderlich (Athens, 2013), 296–336; 
Faiza Patel, “Syria, the Security Council, and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention: a Reply to Jens Iverson”, Lawfare (online), 4 November 
2013, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/syria-the-security-
council-and-the-chemical-weapons-convention-a-reply-to-jens-
iverson/ (accessed 26 May 2015). 
181 However, non-aliged states and others have regularly 
rejected such proposals because they fear a loss of sovereignty: 
cussions on establishing a permanent UN inspectorate 
to investigate nuclear, biological and chemical weap-
ons programmes.182 Legal and political hurdles would 
probably make such a global verification instrument 
very difficult to realise. Nevertheless, upgrading the UN 
Secretary-General Mechanism might be a viable, prag-
matic alternative. 
The Role of Germany 
For several reasons, it is in Germany’s interest that 
measures to control WMD in areas of limited state-
hood become more effective. The proliferation of nu-
clear, biological and chemical weapons – especially to 
terrorist groups – poses a risk to Germany’s national 
security. Proliferation also undermines the inter-
national order. 
Middle powers such as Germany bear a special 
responsibility to strengthen the international order. 
They have significant financial, personnel and techni-
cal capacities for providing practical support to non-
proliferation regimes. Additionally, Germany pos-
sesses a high degree of international political legiti-
macy and credibility, which is, inter alia, based on its 
commitment to disarmament, arms control and non-
proliferation. These factors facilitate German efforts 
to find partners who are also interested in stabilising 
and improving the international order. 
Germany supports efforts to control WMD in areas 
of limited statehood in many different ways. For in-
stance, Berlin took on political responsibility by sec-
onding a German diplomat to be deputy head of the 
JIM. It also provides practical assistance, for example 
by making available a destruction facility for the 
elimination of Libya’s chemical weapons precursors 
as well as dangerous substances produced by the hy-
drolysis of Syrian mustard gas.183 German laboratories 
also analysed Syrian chemical weapons. In Libya, Ger-
many participated in the construction of a facility 
 
see e.g. Trevor Findlay, “Verification and the BWC: Last 
Gasp or Signs of Life?”, Arms Control Today 36, no. 7 (September 
2006): 12–16, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/ 
BWCVerification (accessed 25 November 2016). 
182 Cf. Trevor Findlay, A Standing United Nations Verification 
Body: Necessary and Feasible, Compliance Chronicles, 1 (Ottawa, 
December 2005), https://carleton.ca/npsia/wp-content/ 
uploads/CC1.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). 
183 Destruction took place at the GEKA facility in Munster, 
which is operated by the German Federal government. The 
same company also destroyed Libyan chemical weapons pre-
cursors in 2016. 
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to destroy chemical weapons; in Iraq, it is likewise 
involved in the elimination of chemical weapons.184 
Berlin has held exercises and training courses for UN 
experts who can be deployed under the UN Secretary-
General Mechanism, and has thus contributed to 
further developing these instruments. The Federal 
Government has also provided logistical support for 
WMD control missions, for instance by flying experts 
and inspectors to and from Libya. 
However, the crises of the past few years have also 
demonstrated limits of Germany’s support and en-
gagement. Like other EU states, Germany was not pre-
pared to host a destruction facility for Syrian chemical 
weapons on its own territory. Politically, Germany has 
also rarely been a driving force of efforts to improve 
WMD control. One explanation for this lack of ambi-
tion is the EU’s overall paralysis on many questions 
of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. 
However, if the United States continues to detach 
itself from the international order it will become 
increasingly important that Germany supports the 
disarmament agenda financially, politically and prac-
tically. Few states have the capacities Germany does. 
Berlin could certainly still increase its efforts, for 
instance by shifting resources from the G7’s Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction towards efforts to con-
trol WMD in areas of limited statehood.185 
The German Federal Foreign Office emphasises the 
importance of good contingency planning. Germany’s 
foreign policy is founded in part on the realisation 
that the crisis is “not an exception to the rule within 
globalisation”, but rather a “permanent epiphenome-
non, sometimes even a product of globalisation”. Sim-
ultaneously Germany views “multilateral treaties and 
mechanisms” in the field of non-proliferation, arms 
control and disarmament as an indispensable contri-
bution to successful regulatory policy.186 Institutionally, 
however, disarmament and crisis prevention are fre-
quently kept separate: disarmament is primarily 
 
184 Cf. German Federal Foreign Office, Übereinkommen 
über das Verbot chemischer Waffen (CWÜ), (Berlin, 8 January 
2016), http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/ 
Friedenspolitik/Abruestung/BioChemie/Verbot-C-Waffen_ 
node.html (accessed 16 December 2016). 
185 Cf. German Federal Foreign Office, Die Globale Partnerschaft 
gegen die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen (Berlin, 16 Feb-
ruary 2015), http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/ 
GlobaleFragen/G8_G20_Gestaltungsmaechte/G8/Globale-
Partnerschaft-MVW_node.html (accessed 16 December 2016). 
186 German Federal Foreign Office, Review 2014 (see note 7), 8. 
treated in the Foreign Ministry’s new Directorate-Gen-
eral for International Order, the United Nations and 
Arms Control, whereas crises are addressed in the 
equally new Directorate-General S (Crisis Prevention, 
Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction). With 
a view to future challenges of WMD control, it would 
be useful to enhance connections between these two 
departments and to bring in existing expertise from 
the Federal Ministry of Defence. 
It remains difficult for Germany to find partners for 
joint initiatives to strengthen arms control. Germany’s 
attempt to give NATO a greater role in non-prolifera-
tion, disarmament and arms control has stalled (at 
best) since the Ukraine crisis.187 
The EU, in 2003 adopted the European Security 
Strategy and, in parallel, the “EU strategy against 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”. In both 
documents, the EU positioned itself as a driving force 
in further developing global non-proliferation instru-
ments. The successor document, the EU Global Strat-
egy presented in 2016, does not contain any ambitious 
goals on disarmament, arms control or non-prolifera-
tion.188 
The EU will nevertheless remain Germany’s pre-
ferred and most important operational framework for 
arms control. Berlin could therefore suggest that the 
EU develop a follow-up document to the 2003 non-
proliferation strategy, much of which is now obsolete. 
In this context, discussions might also be initiated on 
how the EU can contribute more effectively to WMD 
control in areas of limited statehood. 
Finally, the German Federal Government could use 
the German presidency of the G20, the group of most 
important industrialised and emerging nations, to 
promote greater agreement on the need to strengthen 
non-proliferation regimes. Among the G20 are global 
players that can shape policy and might be potential 
partners in developing multilateral instruments. 
 
187 Cf. Oliver Meier and Simon Lunn, “Trapped: NATO, 
Russia, and the Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, in 
Arms Control Today, no. 1/2 (January and February 2014): 18–24, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_01-02/Trapped-NATO-
Russia-and-the-Problem-of-Tactical-Nuclear-Weapons (accessed 
25 April 2014). 
188 The EU’s Global Strategy principally addresses non-pro-
liferation instruments from the perspective of expanding 
existing rules and norms: see Shared Vision, Common Action: A 
Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign 
And Security Policy (Brussels, June 2016), 41–42, http://eeas. 
europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (accessed 
20 March 2017). 
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Abbreviations 
BWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction [= Biological Weapons Convention] 
CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization 
CTITF (United Nations) Counter-Terrorism Implementation 
Task Force 
CWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction [= Chemical 
Weapons Convention] 
DAT Declaration Assessment Team 
FFM Fact Finding Mission 
GPS Global Positioning System 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICC International Criminal Court 
IS Islamic State 
JIM Joint Investigative Mechanism 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NPT (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OPCW  Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons 
UNDSS  United Nations Department of Safety and Security 
UNITAR  United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
UNMOVIC  United Nations Monitoring, Verification and 
Inspection Commission 
UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services 
UNOSAT  Operational Satellite Applications Programme 
UNSCOM  United Nations Special Commission 
UNSMIL  United Nations Support Mission in Libya 
WMD Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction 
